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The Sale of English Justice
KIMBERLY ANN PAGE*
The first object of any tyrant in Whitehall would be to make Parliament ut-
terly subservient to his will; and the next to overthrow or diminish trial by
jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of
twelve of his countrymen. So that trial by jury is more than an instrument
of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that
shows that freedom lives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The jury system is a cherished fundamental right of English common law
laid out in the Magna Carta in the thirteenth century.' The jury system was so
enshrined in English heritage that while America wished to rid itself of English
rule in 1776, America did not shed itself of this English tradition, thus, James
Madison adopted the defendant's right to a jury trial in the United States Consti-
tution3 . An important distinction between the Magna Carta and the US Constitu-
tion should be noted, the Magna Carta grants a man judgement by his peers, but
not the right to elect a trial by jury trial over a bench trial. Not until 1855 were
English defendants given the option of either a summary trial or trial by jury in
cases of petty larcenies. 4 By the 1870's, Parliament passed various statutes list-
* I wish to thank my husband, Pete Pellegrino, for taking the kids to the park in order that I
could write this article and for much needed support and proofreading.
1 TREvOR GROVE, THE JURY MAN'S TALE 11 (1998) (citing Lord Devlin from TRIAL BYJURY
the book based on his 1956 Hamlyn lecture).
2 MAGNA CARTA, Sec. 29, confirmed by the seal of Edward I in 1297, states: "No Freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but
by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right."
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy trial and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed...." Id.
4 Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System: A Report, Chptr. 6, Managing the Distribution
of Cases between the Courts, The United Kingdom Home Office Web Page
<www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpd/pvv/crimrev6.htm> [hereinafter Narey Report]. The 1855
Administration of Justice Act allowed justices, with the defendant's consent, to try cases summarily
rather than by indictment or jury trial. This idea was suggested to speed trials and diminish expenses.
Before the 1855 Act, felonies were solely tried by indictment and there was no election by the
defendant. Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System: A Report, Chapter 6, Election for Trial,
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ing other offences to allow trials either by judge or jury, but the magistrate had
the prerogative to overrule the defendant's wishes for a jury trial.5 The Criminal
Justice Act of 1925 included an exhaustive list of triable either way (hereinafter
TEW) offences including serious theft, assault and forgery.6
Today, the English have a three-tier system of justice where indictment
cases of serious crimes such as death, rape, blackmail, robbery, assault and theft,
are heard in Crown Courts with a jury; summary cases, where there is no threat
to life, are heard in magistrates' court before three judges'; and a third tier of
TEW crimes like burglary, unlawful wounding, assault without actual bodily
harm, and petty theft, which can be tried either in Crown Court or magistrates'
court depending on the defendant's discretion and the seriousness of the crimes.'
Over the last twenty-five years, the number of third tier offences has been slowly
defused and thus the defendant's right to elect a jury trial has narrowed. The
current government suggests eliminating all TEW offenses so that only a magis-
trate judge determines if a defendant has a judge or jury trial.
The sole arbitrator of a defendant's fate would rest in the hands of three
magistrate judges, who may have no legal background, 9 but can sentence defen-
dants up to six months in prison and a £5,000 fine."0 In contrast, a legally
trained judge in Crown Court regulates a case before a jury." Professionalism
comes at a price, however; as a case going through the Crown Courts can cost
the government £3,100, whereas a case directed to magistrates' court can cost a
mere £295."2 The number of TEW cases as well as the summary offences rose
last year by 1.8%. "
The United Kingdom"4 is a country where a balanced budget is not just a
History, Home Office Web Page <www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpd/pvv/crimrev6.htm> [hereinafter
Narey Report].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 DAVIES ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 158 (1995).
8 Id. at 158. Hereinafter these cases will be referred to as TEW or triable either way cases.
9 Id. at 152-3. See section IIA for a discussion of magistrates' qualifications.
10 Id. at 157. A pound is worth approximately 1.6 U.S. Dollars at the time of this writing,
therefore the fine can be up to about $8,000. For the purposes of this article, all monetary figures
will be kept in British pounds.
I I Judicial Statistics, The Crown Court: Committals for Trial [hereinafter Judicial Statistics
Annual Report (1998) at <www.open.gov.uk/lcd/courtfr.htm>. TEW cases that are heard in
Crown Court are tried by a circuit judge, recorder or assistant recorder, and sometimes by a High
Court judge.
12 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 7, at 173. A study done in 1988-89 found the difference in the
two courts staggering. While no recent study has been done, the cost has most likely not gone down
in eleven years.
13 Crown Prosecution Service, 1998-99 Annual Report 25 (London: The Stationary Office
Lmtd. 1998-1999).
14 The United Kingdom is comprised of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Great
Britain is the island composed of England, Scotland and Wales. This paper deals with just the
English and Welsh justice systems.
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campaign pledge from a politician's mouth, but a necessity. The British live on
an island with a relatively narrow tax base given their commitment to a socialist
system of healthcare and welfare. Every section of the government must care-
fully account for the money they spend, and the Criminal Justice System is no
exception. Therefore, in 1997, when the figures showed a rise in TEW cases
possibly going to expensive Crown Court, the Conservative Home Secretary"5
proposed changing certain TEW cases to summary cases, thus eliminating the
jury trial option for a defendant.' 6 At that time the Shadow Home Secretary, Mr.
Jack Straw, stated that abolishing the jury trial was "not only wrong, but short-
sighted, and likely to prove ineffective."'"
This past year Mr. Straw reversed himself and proposed the Criminal Jus-
tice (Mode of Trial) Bill to Parliament's House of Commons 8 by which TEW
cases would to be examined and determined by a magistrate as to whether they
could be heard in Crown Court or magistrates' court, rather than by the choice of
the defendant.' 9 Two versions of this bill20 have failed to pass the House of
15 The Home Secretary's office governs a wide range of domestic affairs including proposing
legislation on criminal justice matters. The Home Office does not govern the courts, that area is
overseen by the Lord Chancellor's office which governs magistrates' court, Crown Court, the
Department of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Services.
16 Heather Hallett et.al., Letters to the Editor, Option of Trial By Jury Under Threat, THE
TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 1998, available in < http:/www/the-times.co.uk/> or
< http:/www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98.n814.a04.html >.
17 Id. The shadow government refers to the party not in power but they have all the leaders of
an administration picked out to be able to step into the role of government at any time an election is
held and the ruling party ousted. In 1997, the Conservative government led by John Major was in
power. Today the Labour Party is in power with Mr. Tony Blair as Prime Minister and Mr. Jack
Straw as the Home Secretary overseeing the Home Office. The Home Office manages legislation
proposed to Parliament. See Home Office Web Site: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk>.
18 PAUL SILK & RHODRI WALTERS, How PARLIAMENT WORKS 116 (1998)Laws are made by
being introduced in either the elected House of Commons or the House of Lords. The House of
Lords membership is comprised of peers appointed for life, heredity peers and clergy members of the
Anglican Church. Usually a bill becomes law after it has passed through both the House of
Commons and the House of Lords and is signed by the sovereign..
19 Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill, House of Lords (Session 1999-00) states:
A BILL TO Make provision for determining the mode of trial in the case of offences
triable either summarily or on indictmen,; and for connected purposes. BE IT
ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, dnd Commons, in this present Parliament as-
sembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
1. The following shall be substituted for sections 19 to 22 of the Magistrates' Courts
Act 1980 (offences triable either way: determination of mode of trial):
19. - (1) The court shall consider whether the accused ought to be tried summa-
rily or on indictment.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) above the court-
(a) shall permit the prosecutor and the accused to make representations, and
(b) shall have regard to any representations under paragraph (a) and to the mat-
ters specified in subsection (3) below.
(3) Those matters are-
(a) the nature of the case;
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(b) whether the circumstances make the offence one of serious character;
(c) whether the punishment which a magistrates' court would have power to
impose for it would be adequate;
(d) whether the accused's livelihood would be substantially diminished as a re-
sult of conviction or as a result of punishment of a kind or magnitude likely to
be imposed by the court on conviction;
(e) whether the accused's reputation would be seriously damaged as a result of
conviction or as a result of punishment of a kind or magnitude likely to be im-
posed by the court on conviction; and
(f) any other circumstances which appear to the court to be relevant.
(4) The court may be informed that the accused has a previous conviction and
may be given details of the conviction if necessary-
(a) to rebut or explain anything said by the accused, and
(b) for the purpose of enabling the court to consider the matters specified in
subsection (3)(e) above.
(5) A justice of the peace who in reliance on subsection (4) above is informed
that the accused has a previous conviction shall not participate in any of the fol-
lowing in respect of the offence-
(a) a summary trial;
(b) an inquiry into the information;
(c) an appeal to the Crown Court.
20. - (1) The court shall inform the accused of its decision following considera-
tion of mode of trial under section 19 above.
(2) Where the court decides that the accused ought to be tried summarily then,
subject to the outcome of any appeal under subsection (4) below, the accused
shall be tried summarily.
(3) Where the court decides that the accused ought to be tried on indictment the
information shall be inquired into by examining justices.
(4) The accused may appeal to the Crown Court against a decision of a magis-
trates' court that he ought to be tried summarily if-
(a) he made representations under section 19(2)(a) above that he ought to be
tried on indictment, and(b) he complies with any applicable condition imposed
by rules under section 144 below.
(5) If the appeal is allowed the information shall be inquired into by examining
justices.
21. - (1) This section applies where a prosecution is being carried on by-
(a) the Attorney General,
(b) the Solicitor General, or
(c) the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(2) If the person carrying on the prosecution applies for the accused to be tried
on indictment-
(a) sections 19 and 20 above shall not apply, and
(b) the information shall be inquired into by examining justices.
(3) The Director of Public Prosecutions may not make an application under
subsection (2) above without the consent of the Attorney General.
22. - (1) This section applies where the offence charged by the information is
an offence listed in the first column of Schedule 2 to this Act (a "scheduled of-
fence").
(2) Before proceeding in accordance with section 19 above, the court shall con-
sider whether the value involved in relation to the offence exceeds the relevant
sum.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above-
(a) the relevant sum is £5,000,
(b) "the value involved" means the value identified in the relevant entry in the
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second column of Schedule 2,
(c) the value shall be measured in accordance with the third column of that
Schedule,
(d) the material time mentioned in that Schedule shall be taken to be the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed, and
(e) the court shall permit the prosecutor and the accused to make representa-
tions and shall have regard to any representations made by either of them.
(4) If the court is satisfied that the value involved in relation to the offence ex-
ceeds the relevant sum, sections 19 to 21 above shall apply.
(5) In any other case-
(a) those sections shall not apply, and
(b) the offence shall be treated as if it were triable only summarily.
(6) Where a person is convicted by a magistrates' court of a scheduled offence,
it shall not be open to him to appeal to the Crown Court against the conviction
on the ground that the convicting court's decision as to the value involved was
mistaken.
(7) If the offence charged is one with which the accused is charged jointly with
a person who has not attained the age of 18-
(a) that person shall be entitled to make representations for the purposes of sub-
section (2) above, and
(b) the court shall have regard to those representations.
(8) If-
(a) the accused is charged on one occasion with two or more scheduled offences
and the court considers that they constitute or form part of a series of two or
more offences of the same or a similar character, or
(b) the offence charged consists in incitement to commit two or more scheduled
offences,
this section shall have effect as if a reference to the value involved were a ref-
erence to the aggregate of the values involved.
(9) Section 12A(8) of the Theft Act 1968 (which determines when a vehicle is
recovered) shall apply for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to this Act
as it applies for the purposes of that section."
2. - (1) Schedule I to this Act (minor and consequential amendments) shall have
effect.
(2) The enactments listed in Schedule 2 are hereby repealed to the extent speci-
fied.
20 The difference made in the second Bill, or Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No.2) Bill,
House of Commons (Session 1999-00), is Section 19 (4) & (5) are eliminated and (2) & (3) are
replaced with:
ITihe court shall consider (a) the nature of the case; (b) any of the circumstances of the
offence (but not of the accused) which appears to the court to be relevant; and (c)
whether having regard to the matters to be considered under paragraph (b), the pun-
ishment which a magistrates' court would have power to impose for the offence would
be adequate.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1) above the court-
(a)shall permit the prosecution and the accused to make representations about the mat-
ters to be considered under subsection (2); and
(b) shall have regard to any representations made under paragraph (a) above. (empha-
sis added).
Basically, the second version took out the language that a class distinction should be noted. The
first version required a magistrate to consider the defendant's reputation and livelihood before
choosing between summary or jury trial. The House of Lords rejected the idea that the titled gentry,
clergy and professionals should be granted a jury trial.
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Lords.21 However under special Parliament Acts, any bill that passes two suc-
cessive sessions of the House of Commons, can be presented for the Queen's
signature without the agreement of the House of Lords.22
The removal of the defendant's right to choose a jury trial for crimes like
theft and assault seems inevitable. This article will, in Section II, briefly explain
the structure of the English law system discussing the differences between magis-
trates' court and Crown Court.23 Section III will examine the viewpoints of the
Home Office for restricting jury trials as well as the opposition's opinions.
There will be a review of various evaluative studies that have explored how
elimination of the jury trial will affect the justice system, with a special look at
the Diplock Trials in Northern Ireland where since 1973, criminal cases have
been tried by a judge rather than a jury. Section IV will investigate the budget-
ary savings of dispensing with the jury system to determine whether the cost sav-
ings is worth the elimination of the ancient tradition of being judged by ones
peers. This article concludes that despite the cost savings of eliminating the de-
fendant's right to choose a jury trial, the alternative of a summary trial is not
blind justice, but rather a perfunctory means of granting a guilty verdict.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW
A trial by jury "keeps the administration of law in accord with the wishes
and feelings of the community." Oliver Wendall Holmes 4
The English Criminal Justice system is adversarial, meaning the defendant
must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.25 This was not originally the
21 See Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill, House of Lords (Session 1999-00). The
second version of the bill was withdrawn from the House of Lords before it could be rejected..
22 SILK & WALTERS, supra note 18, at 143. The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 allow for a
bill to pass without the House of Lords approval after a minimum of a year between the first and
second reading periods and the second and third reading periods, and the Lords have received the bill
at least one month before the end of each of the two sessions. See also, Marie Woolf, Straw Hit By
Revolt on Jury Curbs, The DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 8, 2000, at 1. See also Frances Gibb & James
Landale, Straw Faces Humiliation on Jury Trial, THE TIMES (London), August 28, 2000, at 1
(reporting that on Aug. 28, 2000 Mr. Straw may have to drop this legislation because of a backlog in
the House of Lords. However, that has yet to be seen and it does not preclude Mr. Straw from
introducing the bill a third time); see also SILK & WALTERS, supra note 18, 145 (noting that the last
time the Sovereign did not sign a bill from Parliament was in 1707, thus making it an unlikely event
that Queen Elizabeth II would deny her signature).
23 The English justice system encompasses England and Wales. Scotland has its own system of
justice, as does Northern Ireland. Thus, there is no "British" justice system since each of the
Commonwealth states has its own system, foregoing a United Kingdom justice system.
24 GROVE, supra note 1, at vii (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes).
25 See JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT A JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE
ADVERSARY SSYTEM 56 (1995). This is in contrast with most of Europe in which a majority of the
courts act as the fact finder and take on an inquisitorial role. To distinguish exactly what the
adversarial system is, the best definition comes from Justice Felix Frankfurter as the "requirement of
specific charges, their proof beyond reasonable doubt, the protection of the accused from
confessions... the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to
be supplied by government when... necessary, the duty to advise the accused of his constitutional
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case in 12"'-century England when justice was sought through trial by ordeal,
such as putting one hand into boiling water or holding a red-hot poker. If the de-
fendant's hand healed quickly, innocence was proclaimed because God inter-
vened on the defendant's behalf. A person who sank when thrown in the water
was considered not guilty, whereas a floating defendant was unnatural and there-
fore guilty. The biggest problem was the "innocent" usually drowned.26
In June 1215, trial by ordeal was put to an end when King John signed the
Magna Carta at Runnymede. His grandson, King Edward I confirmed the verac-
ity of the promised charter by signing it into statute in 1297, so that no freeman
would be condemned without lawful judgment of his peers. 27
In the early days of the jury, being a member was not a popular pastime.
Jurors were sequestered (meaning no food or drink) until they reached a unani-
mous verdict.28 In one libel case, the largest man refused to find a landowner
libel against a very influential brewer who wanted the jurors held until they found
the landowner libel. The stout juryman reminded his fellow jurors he was the
biggest and strongest thus starvation could take the rest before he would vote for
libel. The brewer finally ordered their release and accepted their contrary ver-
dict.2 9
English jurors were often punished in Tudor3" times if they did not return
verdicts in deference to the Crown. It was not until 1670 that jurors' independ-
ence was firmly established with the trial of Quakers William Penn and William
Mead. 3' Despite the overwhelming guilty evidence, the jury refused to convict
the men of seditious assembly and the judge furiously locked up the jury for two
nights without food, drink, fire, tobacco or chamber pot.32 The judge then fined
rights." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
26 GROVE, supra note 1, at 87 (providing a range of medieval methods of accessing guilt, all of
which were put aside on the urging of the Vatican which decided maybe God did not intervene as
often as we would like).
27 JULIET GARDINER & NEIL WENBORN, THE HISTORY TODAY COMPANION TO BRIsH
HISTORY 492 (1995)The Magna Carta was a new type of rebellion by noblemen who usually fought in
revolt against the King's policies. King John signed the charter of rights to gain time from the
arguments. However, within three months, the noblemen resumed fighting and attempted to dethrone
John. The charter was not made into statute until 1225 under Henry Ill. See also, MAGNA CARTA,
supra note 2, Sec. 29.
28 GROVE, supra note 1, at 90. There were no majority verdicts as there are in modern-day
English law.
29 Id. It was not until 1870 that English law changed to allow jurors food and a warm fire, as
long as jurors paid for such amenities.
30 Welford and Wickham Primary School: History of the Tudors and Stuarts Page:
< http://www.wickham.newbury.sch.uk/topics/tudors/tudors.html >. The Tudors were the
Sovereigns reigning from 1485-1603 and include Henry VII, Henry VIII, and his children Edward
VI, Mary, and Elizabeth I.
31 GROVE, supra note 1, at 91-92. This is the same William Penn who founded Pennsylvania.
32 Id. Penn and Mead were clearly guilty of preaching at a church, but the highly unpopular
seditious acts were aimed at nonconformity. Penn and Mead shouted encouragement to the jurors to
"Mind your privilege. Give not away your right." Id.
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each juror 40 marks33 and imprisoned them until the fine was paid. After months
of imprisonment, a writ of habeas corpus garnered their release. The jurors' ver-
dict was then accepted, despite the judge's persuasion.' Thus England moved
into the modem acceptance of jury verdicts as we know today.
A. The Steps From Crime to Trial
A trial "seeks not to establish the truth, but provides a process for the con-
viction or acquittal of the accused which affects the kind of evidence the police
must secure."
35
The English police have far more "sentencing" discretion than an American
police officer. After a crime is committed, the police, or bobby,36 may arrest a
suspect or request a person report to the police station for questioning.37 After
questioning, the police decide whether to charge the suspect. If charged, the
suspect can be given bail or kept in custody.3" The defendant is then brought be-
fore a magistrates' court to decide the mode of trial39 that determines, "length of
delay before the trial, the probability and duration of remand in custody, the
anxiety for defendants, the probability of acquittal, the severity of sentence if
convicted, [and] the cost to the public." The mode of trial is not determined
solely by the magistrate's whim, but by statute. Offences are divided into three
categories: (1) Offences triable by indictment are sent to Crown Court, (2) Of-
fences triable by summary trial are heard only in magistrates' court, and (3)
TEW offences which are dependant upon whether the defendant wishes a trial in
Crown Court or magistrates' court.' Before the mode of trial process is dis-
cussed, an explanation of the magistrates' courts is necessary.
33 Id. at 92. One mark, or "merk" as the Scottish called it, is approximately 6 shillings, 8
pence. Today this amount is worth £32.00. JOE CRIBB ET AL., THE COIN ATLAS 18 (1999).
34 GROVE, supra note 1, at 92. Today a plaque hangs in the main criminal courthouse in
London, the Old Bailey, to remind jurors they can vote their conscience without fear of reprisal,
thanks to the stubbornness of Penn and Mead's jurors.
35 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 16.
36 This term comes from the name of Robert Peel, who founded the London Metropolitan
Police.
37 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 18. The police have five avenues after a crime is
committed: (1) The police can interview a person and write a report for a summons which results in
either no formal action, a written caution or is forwarded to magistrates' court; (2) An informal
caution can be given to a person, and that is the end of the matter; (3) An arrest is made; ( 4) A
suspect can voluntarily accompany the police to their station, or; (5) The police can request that a
person report to the police station.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 19.
40 ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY 228-29 (1994).
Neither England nor Wales has a written penal code or even a definitive statement of its criminal
justice principles. DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 10. The sources of law are from legislation
passed by Parliament, case law or commun law, which still governs some serious crime and murder.
Id. at 37.
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B. Magistrates' Court
I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of the realm,
without fear or favour, affection or ill will. 4
Magistrates, or Justices of the Peace, came about in 1264 when Simon de
Montfort appointed a keeper of the peace. 42  The Justices of the Peace Act of
1341 gave magistrates power to investigate and arrest suspects. 3 Until 1905 the
magistrates had to be men owning a certain amount of property." Today, about
95% of all criminal cases have some dealing with the magistrates' court. 5
Therefore, it is almost certain that defendants will deal with the magistrates who
run these courts. The magistrates are unpaid lay people with no legal qualifica-
tions, aged between 27-65 who wish to serve their community by sitting on the
courts. 6 The Lord Chancellor's office appoints magistrates to the bench after an
interview and attempts to represent a cross section of the community with people
who have integrity and local standing.47 Once appointed, the magistrates sit on a
bench of three judges with a legally qualified clerk as an advisor.48 In criminal
matters the magistrates decide on guilt or innocence in summary trials, matters of
bail, requests for warrants of arrest and searches, and sentencing. Magistrates
can also sit in on Crown Court appeals from magistrates' court convictions and
41 BRYAN GIBSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAGISTRATES' COURT, 11 (1995) (citing The
Magistrates' Oath).
42 Id. at 11-12. When landowners were away, they appointed others to decide disputes.
43 Id. at 12.
44 Id.
45 How to Become a Magistrate, Lord Chancellor's Department, http://www.open.gov.
uk/lcd/magist/mag2.htm>. See also DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 152, (stating that 93%
of all cases end in magistrates' court).
46 How to Become a Magistrate, supra note 45. Applicants must live with 15 miles of the
boundary they wish to serve. They need to have satisfactory sight and hearing, but do not need to be
a British citizen. While they are unpaid, they may be reimbursed for travel, subsistence and financial
loss. Currently, the magistrates are battling an image of being only white middle-aged men and
women from the upwardly mobile middle-class. However 6.7 percent of all magistrates are
minorities, which is slightly higher than minorities in the general population. Frances Gibb, Give JPs
Some Street Cred., THE TIMES (London), Apr. 4, 2000, Law Section, at 9.
47 DAVIS ET. AL., supra note 7, at 153. However the Lord Chancellor's office does not
appoint police officers or civilian employees of the police or armed forces, their spouse or partners
thereof, traffic wardens, full-time members of Her Majesty's forces, employees of the Crown
Prosecution Service, Prison Service, Probation Service or Magistrates' Courts Service, nor someone
with a non-discharged bankruptcy or someone convicted of a serious offence or a number of minor
offences, nor a member of Parliament or perspective candidate. The Lord Chancellor's office wants
independent minded people, not an influential person with an agenda. Id. See also How to Become a
Magistrate, supra note 45. The Lord Chancellor's office sights six key qualities for a ideal
magistrate as: good character, understanding and communication, social awareness, maturity and
sound temperament, sound judgment, commitment and reliability. Id.
48 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 152 (stating that he senior magistrate acts as the
spokesperson). See also GIBSON, supra note 41, at 26 (describing how the magistrates are given legal
training before they sit on the bench and then are expected to re-train every three years. Training is
compulsory and missing a session means the magistrate must resign. Id.
2000
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sentencing."
The other persons practicing in magistrates' court include barristers or so-
licitors for the defendant and the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS). Barristers'0
are equivalent to American attorneys in their duties in court. Only recently are
solicitors allowed to advocate for a defendant in magistrates' court rather than
merely advise.5 The role of the CPS is to give pre-charge advise to police, re-
view all cases for sufficiency of the evidence and proceed where it is in the inter-
est of the public, as well as conduct the prosecution of cases in magistrates'
court.52 The types of cases tried summarily in magistrates' court by CPS are
driving with excess alcohol, common assault, assaulting a police officer, and tak-
ing a vehicle without the owner's consent.53 The TEW offences include theft,
burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, criminal damage and unlawful
wounding.54
49 How to Become a Magistrate, supra note 45. The magistrates also hear civil matters
pertaining to Family Court proceedings and non-payment of council tax. Special magistrate
committees also decide on liquor licensing and regulate licenses and permits for betting and gaming
clubs. Id. On the average they sit in court from 26 half-days a year, up to 35 half-days a year. They
are instructed to sit whole days if necessary. Id.
50 Barristers do not usually meet the defendant initially in simple cases, but arrive on the scene
when a case is about to go to trial. All preliminary negotiations and meetings with the defendant are
discussed with a solicitor. Barristers must complete more years of training and work unpaid in the
court system before earning their title, whereas solicitors are allowed a sponsor who may eventually
offer the solicitor a job upon completion of course work. Barristers have no guarantee of work upon
completion of their coursework. Therefore the student wishing to become a barrister must take out
large loans or have family money.
51 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 9. Barristers are primarily court advocates that can work
in both magistrates' and Crown Court. For a solicitor to advocate, the solicitor must take a special
course and be certified as a solicitor advocate. A visual distinction can be made between barristers
and solicitors in the courtroom, in that only barristers have the privilege of wearing a wig.
52 Id. at 122. The CPS also instructs the Queen Counsel that prosecutes cases in Crown Court
and liaises with other criminal justice agencies. CPS is a relatively young organization started in
1985 after a White Paper recommended one organization to conduct all criminal proceedings
instituted by the police. Prior to 1985, the police investigated and prosecuted routine offences in
magistrates' court and I of 43 authorities in England and Wales handled more complex cases in
magistrates' court. The Director of Public Prosecutions, which was established in 1879 and now
oversees CPS, handled the prosecutions of murder, national security cases and prosecution of police
and public figures in Crown Court, while all other Crown Court cases were prosecuted by individual
barristers on behalf of the police. Id. at 121-22. A Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure known
as the Phillips Commission recommended that England and Wales needed a uniform and independent
system of prosecution rather than the muddled role of police being both investigators and prosecutors.
Thus one of the roles the CPS does not play is that it cannot initiate proceedings or direct police to
investigate matters. Id. While CPS handles most criminal prosecutions, other agencies do
prosecutions for consumer protection, environmental health, health and safety violations, pollution
control, customs and excise taxes, inland revenue taxes, frauds, and trade and industry matters. Id.
at 133.
53 Id. at 157. Statutes define which offences are designated for summary trial.
54 Id. at 158. The seriousness of the crime is determined by whether the prosecution
recommends the charge be summarily tried in magistrates' court or as a TEW offence for which the
defendant is allowed to elect the type of trial. If a case has damage less than £2000 and no knowing
or reckless damage to property or person, CPS will recommend a summary trial. Common assault
THE SALE OF ENGLISH JUSTICE
On October 2, 2000, magistrates will be required to give a written judgment
for all findings of guilt and sentencing, thereby giving structure to the criminal
justice system and guarding against arbitrary and biased judgments." Currently,
the mode of trial decisions are not written decisions. The court asks both the
prosecution and the defense to make a representation of the type of trial the case
should be committed. If the prosecution suggests a summary trial and the magis-
trates agree, the defendant is asked to submit consent.56 If the defendant submits
to summary trial, the case is tried in magistrates' court; otherwise the defendant
has the absolute right to a jury trial in Crown Court.
Since 1991, magistrates were instructed to assess TEW cases using the crite-
ria in National Mode of Trial Guidelines.57 The prosecution's Code for Crown
Prosecutors instructs them to use the same guidelines and further consider:
Speed must never be the only reason for asking for a case to stay in the
magistrates' court. But Crown Prosecutors should consider the effect of any
likely delay if they send a case to the Crown Court, and any possible stress on
victims and witnesses if the case is delayed.58
In 1991 there were 490,000 defendants charged with TEW or indictment
only offences, of which 80,000 were committed for jury trial to the Crown
Court.59 Therefore, 84% of the cases were summary tried or plead guilty to in
magistrates' court. Despite Crown Court having a mere 16% of magistrates'
court cases, from Crown Court prospective, 76% of its cases come from TEW
elections.' In 1998, these figures rose to magistrates' court dealing with 1.4
million cases and around 125,000 cases in Crown Court.61 Because of these fig-
ures, the Crown Courts are feeling overworked and researching ways to reduce
and driving while disqualified used to be TEW offences, but the 1988 Criminal Justice Act made
them summary offences. Id. at 158-59. There has been a slow whittling down of the number of
offenses classified as TEW as more and more of such offences are reclassified as summary trial only.
55 Id. On October 2
'
, the European Convention on Human Rights will be incorporated into
British law. Jon McLeod, England's gift to the world- Magna Carta, THE TIMES (London), June 27,
2000, Law Section, at 13. The Human Rights Act will require a structured and clear approach to
sentences and findings of guilt. This will aid defendants in deciding whether to appeal a magistrates'
decision.
56 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 229. In a study, 96% of magistrates decided consistent with
the prosecution as to the type of trial it recommended in TEW cases. Suggesting a pro-prosecution
stance on the bench. Id. at 234, (citing DAVID RILEY & JULIE VENNARD, TRIABLE-EITHER-WAY
CASES 11 (1988)).
57 SECRETARIAT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL, MODE OF TRIAL
GUIDELINES (HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE 1995) [hereinafter CJCC SECRETARIAT]. The
Mode of Trial Guidelines' purpose are to aid the magistrates but not direct them in deciding where it
is appropriate for a case to be tried summarily or by jury.
58 Crown Prosecution Service. supra note 13.
59 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 229. Ashworth cites the figure as 490,000, but
approximates that less than 20,000 were indictment only cases.
60 Judicial Statistics Annual Report, supra note 11 (stating that the Crown Court received
104,754 cases for trial, sentence and appeals in 1991).
61 Crown Prosecution Service. supra note 13, at 4.
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delays.62 CPS embraced the Government priority to reduce crime to propose its
new objective of "deal[ing] with prosecution [of] cases in a timely and efficient
manner in partnership with other agencies.'63 It is this goal that focuses attention
on how cases come to Crown Court from magistrates' court through mode of
trial hearings.
C. Mode of Trial Decisions
[The purpose of the Mode of Trial Guidelines] is to provide guidance not di-
rection. They are not intended to impinge upon a magistrate's duty to consider
each case individually and on its own particular facts.'
Although most offences are governed by statute for the mode of trial, in
TEW cases, the magistrates are guided by the following criteria:
-nature of the case
-seriousness of the offence
-magistrates' powers of punishment (including compensation)
-other circumstances making one venue more suitable than the other
-representations of prosecution and defendant.65
The magistrates also are to consider that:
-mode of trial should never be decided because it is convenient or speedy
-Crown Court is the proper venue for difficult questions of law or fact
-the presumption is for summary trial, subject to the defendant's consent.66
Most importantly, the general observations of the guidelines state that "ex-
cept where otherwise stated, either way offenses should be tried summarily"
unless certain facts present themselves in the case.67 The magistrates are to over-
ride the presumption for summary trial if their sentencing powers are insuffi-
cient, and the offence included the use of a weapon that possibly could have or
62 Id. at 13. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) cites the Narey Report on reducing delays,
as prompting it to initiate programs to reduce the number of cases in Crown Court. CPS tested
assisting police in file preparation, designating lay presenters to manage straightforward guilty pleas,
and new procedures for fast tracking more serious indictable only cases so they do not spend as much
time in magistrates' court. The latter fast tracking initiative was scheduled to be initiated this
summer.
63 Id. at 20. The Government aim is "[t]o contribute to the reduction both of crime and the fear
of crime and to increase public confidence in the criminal justice system by fair and independent
review of cases and by firm, fair, and effective prosecution at court." Id.
64 CJCC SECRETARIAT, supra note 57, at 1.
65 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 171. See also CJCC SECRETARIAT, supra note 57, at 1.
66 CJCC SECRETARIAT, supra note 57, at 2.
67 Id. The Guidelines state specific features that call for a jury trial under the offences of
burglary, theft, fraud, handling or possessing stolen property, social security fraud, violence or
assault and domestic violence, Public Order Offences, violence to and neglect of children, indecent
assault, unlawful sexual intercourse, drugs, dangerous driving, and criminal damage.
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did cause serious injury, serious injury was caused by head butting, kicking, or
similar force, serious violence was against a taxi driver, police officer or other
similar official, the victim was very young or elderly, or the offence was racially
motivated.68 The word "and" insures most cases remain in magistrates' court
unless the defendant elects otherwise. If the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill
becomes law, the defendant will not have the jury option because most cases will
be tried summarily.
In TEW cases, once the magistrates have decided the case should be heard
summarily, the defendant is then asked for their venue of choice; magistrates'
court or Crown Court.69 If the defendant decides the case is for magistrates' court
and pleads, the plea is heard and sentencing may or may not be postponed for a
pre-sentencing report. If the defendant or the magistrate elects a jury trial, the
case is adjourned until the case is transferred to Crown Court.7'
Numerous studies were done surrounding the defendant's wishes for a jury
trial. Research by the Home Secretary's office in 1992 regarding why defen-
dants preferred Crown Court found 81 % of solicitors felt a defendant had a better
chance of acquittal in Crown Court, as did 69% of defendants. 7' Other studies
point to a lack of confidence in the fairness of the magistrates' courts.' This
bias may have a factual basis as the acquittal rate for trials in magistrates' court
was 30% in 1985, versus 57% in Crown Court. 73 More recently, the CPS An-
nual Report shows the magistrates' court now has a case load of 1.4 million cases
with 569,976 (40%) being for indictable or TEW offences, this is up by 1.8%
from 1987-88. Of the 989,831 cases to remain in magistrates' court, 98.3% of
the hearings resulted in a conviction!74 This number contrasts sharply with the
1998 Crown Court statistic, where 64% of the defendants who plead not guilty to
all counts were acquitted,75 and in 1999, where 74% of all cases going to trial in
68 Id. at 9 (criteria under violence against the person).
69 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 172. After a decision for summary trial by the magistrates,
the clerk turns to the defendant to say: you have the right to be tried at the Crown Court by a judge
and jury, but should be aware that if you are found guilty or plead guilty you may be committed to
the Crown Court later for sentence if, on hearing more about the facts of the case, you and your
background, the magistrates feel that their own powers of punishment are inadequate. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 173. 70% of solicitors and 62% of the defendants also cited the magistrates were on
the side of the police. 59% of defendants thought they could get a lighter sentence in Crown Court,
whereas only 38% of solicitors cited this as a reason to choose Crown Court. This perception seems
in error as magistrates' court can only sentence defendants to 6 months jail and a £5,000 fine, in
contrast to Crown Court which has no such restrictions. However, 45% of solicitors and 48% of
defendants thought by going to Crown Court they could get more information about the case from the
prosecutor. Id.
72 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 230.
73 Id.
74 Crown Prosecution Service. supra note 13, at 39 (stating that 82% of the cases resulted in
guilty pleas, 11.5% were cases where the defendant was absent but found guilty, 4.8% were
convictions after a trial, and the Magistrates' court dismissed 1.7% its cases, (down from 1.9% in
1997-98 and 2% in 1996-97); in Crown Court, the acquittals were 10.9% of all trials, and of these
total acquittals, 21.1% were directed by the judge and 78.8 % of were from a jury). Id. at 42.
75 Judicial Statistics Annual Report supra note 11, at 10, Table 6.9. Of the acquittals, the judge
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Crown Court resulted in acquittal.76 With such striking differences between the
rate of acquittal between Crown Court and magistrates' court it is a wonder any
defendant would elect a summary trial.
D. How Did Defendant's Trial Election Become Endangered?
We do not think that the defendant should be able to choose their court of
trial solely on the basis that they think that they will get a fairer hearing at one
level than the other. 77
In 1975, the James Committee" recommended that the six types of offenses
be consolidated into three: summary offences, indictable offences and TEW of-
fences. 79  The James Report found that while judges and court staff favored
eliminating TEW offences and allowing only the magistrates to choose the course
of trial, barristers and solicitors wrote to the contrary."t The subsequent 1999
Narey Report of the Review of Delays in the Criminal Justice System, cited that
defendants elected Crown Court over magistrates' court because they wished to
delay proceedings, they wished to remain in a local prison that was close to fam-
ily and friends and lastly, because they hoped for acquittal. 8' Currently, of the
defendants who chose to have their cases heard by jury in Crown Court, two-
thirds change their plea to guilty before the trial.82 The added cost of taking a
case to Crown Court gives rise to the question of why a defendant would risk a
higher fine and jail sentence rather than merely pleading guilty in magistrates'
court.83
Before the 1999 Narey Report, but after the 1975 James Report, there was
the 1993 report by the Royal Commission, better known as the Runciman Com-
mission. The Runciman Commission favored considering the defendant's reputa-
tion and past history, the gravity of the offence, the complexity of the case, and
the likely effect on the defendant, before a magistrate decided upon the mode of
discharged 50%; 15% were acquitted through the discretion of the judge and 35% were acquitted by
the jury. Id. at Table 6.10. Of the 10,761 defendants convicted after a plea of not guilty, 80% were
from a unanimous verdict and the rest were from a majority verdict, (the statistics were the same in
1997). Id. at Table 6.11.
76 Crown Prosecution Servic, supra note 13, at 42. This percentage is derived from total
convictions after trial (11,561) + acquittals (8,668), then divided by convictions.
77 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 174 (citing the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
1993: 87-88).
78 Narey Report, supra note 4, The James Committee The James Committee published The
Distribution of Criminal Business Between the Crown Court and Magistrates' Courts: Report of the
Interdepartmental Committee 1975.
79 See Id. There were three confusing hybrid offences of the right to elect a jury trial.
80 Id.
81 Id. Reasons for electing trial. It should be noted that by remaining in a local prison before
they were sentenced, a defendant was given more visits than a condemned prisoner.
82 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 232.
83 A defendant cannot avoid Crown Court merely by pleading guilty in magistrates' court,
because a magistrate can take a guilty plea and move the sentencing to Crown Court if the magistrate
does not think the sentencing power of magistrates' court is appropriate.
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trial. In cases where the prosecutor and defendant agreed to the mode of trial,
the magistrate was not to be involved in the decision.'
More specifically the Runciman Commission stated:
We believe that the procedure for determining mode of trial should be changed
in order to secure a more rational division of either way cases between the mag-
istrates' court and the Crown Court... We recommend that, where CPS and the
defendant agree that the case is suitable for summary trial, it should proceed to
trial in magistrates' court without further ado. Similarly a case should go to the
Crown Court for trial if both prosecution and defence agree that it should be
tried on indictment. We see no reason why the courts should be concerned with
mode of trial where the prosecution and defence both agree... Where, however,
the defence do not agree with the CPS's proposal on which court should try the
case, the matter should be referred to the magistrates for a decision as happens
now under section 19 of the Magistrates' Court Act.
We do not think that the defendant should be able to choose their court of trial
solely on the basis that they think that they will get a fairer hearing at one level
than the other. Magistrates' courts conduct over 93 per cent of all criminal
cases and should be trusted to try cases fairly. Aggrieved defendants have in
any case a right of appeal by way of a complete rehearing of the evidence by a
judge and two magistrates at the Crown Court. Nor in our view should the de-
fendant be able to choose the mode of trial which they think will offer them a
better chance of acquittal any more than they should be able to choose the judge
who think will give them the most lenient sentence.
s5
While the current proposed bill does not take into consideration the reputa-
tion and standing of the defendant, it is interesting to see that the rest of the Run-
ciman recommendation is coming to fruition. This article does not purport to fa-
vor a class system where moneyed, titled, or professional business people are
given a jury trial while a defendant with a long list of convictions be denied a
jury trial. What is troubling is that with a 98% conviction rate, the magistrates'
courts are considered fair for any defendant.
Should the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill pass into law, the following
scenario could occur. As he is delivering the mail, a postman's path to the door
is blocked by a drunken and verbally abusive elderly uncle. Knowing the uncle
is not a resident of the home, the postman is wary about giving him the post.
However after repeated attempts to walk around the old drunk, the postman being
hemmed in by the hedges and called many names by the abusive uncle, is forced
to push past the uncle. The uncle stumbles and breaks a hip, then accuses the
postman of violence against him. The case is taken up by CPS and under the
Mode of Trial Guidelines, the magistrate may feel his sentencing power to be
84 Narey Report, supra note 4. Magistrates decide venue in all either way cases. The Narey
Report suggested that 18,000 cases would then be heard summarily rather than in Crown Court. Id.
85 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 174 (citing the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
1993: 87-88).
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sufficient in the case. While the factors of age of the victim, and a broken hip,
suggest a jury trial, the proposed bill gives the magistrate the power to hear the
case. The postman would be denied a chance for his peers to judge his actions
and forced to take his chance with the highly convicting magistrates' court. A
postman with an unblemished record could easily be found guilty when a sober
elderly uncle testifies, thus jeopardizing his livelihood for the magistrates' jus-
tice. It is beneficial to see what other commentators think of this potential trend.
III. PROS AND CONS OF ELIMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S ELECTION FOR TRIAL IN
TEW CASES
The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium
upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury. -Mark Twain'6
There are many voices of assent and derision of the removal of the defen-
dant's right to elect a jury trial. It is the Government and the courts that favor
the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill, and the barristers, solicitors and press
that take a dim view. It is important to look at the issues from all sides.
A. Pro: The Narey Report & Fundamental Rights
Magistrates' courts are inseparable from the idea of quick and inexpensive
justice.17
It is not whimsically that the English are looking to rid the defendant of the
choice of a trial by jury. Since this idea has had many years of introduction,
there have been three reports to consider the effect of this decision.88 In 1975 the
James Committee issued a summary entitled: The Distribution of Criminal Busi-
ness Between the Crown Court and Magistrates' Court: Report of the Interde-
partmental Committee.8 9 The James Committee cited a need for a professional
person of good character to have the option of a jury trial if accused of a crime of
dishonesty. In canvassing the opinions of professions in the legal system, solici-
tors, barristers and defendants found the election of trial critical, while judges,
clerks and prosecutors thought there should be no right to a jury trial. 9' The
James Committee honed in on the need for a class distinction and argued that
clergy, as well as both titled and professional people, deserved a jury trial, while
repeat criminals did not deserve such an option.9 '
Getting rid of TEW offenses was suggested by the Royal Commission in
1993 with the caveat that magistrates should consider the defendant's reputation,
past record, the gravity of the offense, the complexity of the case, and its likely
86 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 309 (Franklin R. Rogers ed., University of California Press
1972).
87 GIBSON, supra note 41.
88 Narey Report, supra note 4, The James Committee.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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effect on the defendant. 92 The Runciman Commission favored allowing the de-
fendant and prosecutor who agreed on venue to override a magistrates' deci-
sion.93 This was the first version of the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill.'
The problem with this method of venue decision is that it could easily lead to
class distinctions where a moneyed client would easily be granted a jury trial, but
a poorer, repugnant defendant would be stuck with a summary trial, regardless of
the facts. The House of Lords struck down the first version of the bill based on
these class concerns.
The 1999 Narey Report did not conclude to rid the system of TEW offences
but suggested the final election of jury or summary trial be made by a magistrate
rather than the defendant. 95 The Narey Report rebutted the theory that reputation
is a circumstance necessitating a jury trial by citing a distinguished senior magis-
trate who said that no defendant in memory had chosen a jury trial for reasons of
reputation.' Thus the second version of the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill
was born and submitted to the House of Commons for approval. No longer was
justice to be given based on class.
One of the main arguments against the Criminal Justice, Mode of Trial Bill
is that it will denigrate a fundamental right established by the Magna Carta.
However, the Home Office is quick to point out that a medieval jury of peers
were actually a group of local peers who knew the defendant and not apt to be
impartial. This is contrary to today's magistrates that are independent.'
The right for the defendant to elect a jury trial rather than a summary only
trial came in the middle to late nineteenth century. The Narey Report stated dur-
ing this time, no prisoner was allowed a copy of the accusations against him and
that until 1869, a person could be arrested on mere suspicion, with the burden of
proof upon the defendant to show that he or she was an honest person. The re-
port further stated there was no right to criminal appeals until the twentieth cen-
tury. 9
8
When the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill was introduced in November
of 1999, the Home Secretary, Mr. Jack Straw, reiterated that the right to a jury
trial is not a fundamental right. He stated, ". . .giving defendants a choice of
court is not [a key freedom.] It is frankly eccentric, which is why we in England
and Wales are almost alone in allowing this arrangement to continue. " 9 Mr.
92 Id., Magistrates to decide venue in all either way cases.
93 Id. In Scotland the prosecutor decides on the venue with no right to appeal. Their report
stated there was no conflict with this procedure in Scotland. Id.
94 See infra notes 19 & 20 for the full text of the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill, versions 1
& 2.
95 Narey Report, supra note 4, Reclassification.
96 Id. The senior magistrate stated that defendants who elect a jury trial are experienced and out
to play the system. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Straw On Trial Over Jury Reform, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 1999), available in
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng!ish/ukjpolitics/newsid_527000/527721. stm>.
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Straw was making reference to the fact that other European counties operate on
an inquisitorial system rather than the jury system.'0' o
One issue not to overlook is whether the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill
is incompatible with the Convention on Human Rights Act that England adopts
on October 2, 2000. While some have argued the two are mutually exclusive,'0 '
the Human Rights Act merely entitles a person to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by the law.0 2 There is no funda-
mental right to a jury trial.
B. Con: Practitioners Objections
Nothing in our law is more fundamental than the doing of justice.. . It is vi-
tal to victims of crime, to defendants, and to the confidence of society in our
laws. Lord Alexander of Weedon QC'°3
While the Home Secretary and court officials firmly approve of the Criminal
Justice Bill, barristers and solicitors take the opposite stance. Their concerns can
be classified into (1) Magistrates should not pick the venue, (2) Magistrates'
courts have a higher conviction rate (3) Eliminating the right to election is bad
policy.
The first matter regarding magistrates' choosing the venue derives from the
preponderance of magistrates who favor the view of the prosecution in 96% of
TEW mode of trial decisions. 0" This could be because the prosecution and mag-
istrates follow the same mode of trial guidelines to reach a decision. Andrew
Ashworth, in his evaluative study of the mode of trial decisions, stated another
possibility for such a high cohesion among magistrates and prosecutors could be
that prosecutors have adapted their argument to the practice of the particular
magistrate." This high rate of conformity between magistrates and prosecutors
erodes the presumption that a magistrate is an independent arbitrator of fact in a
summary trial.
Prosecutors have more subtle ways of deciding mode of trial decisions
through charging indictable only offences to get a jury trial or summarily only
offense. However, prosecutors have been found guilty of abuse of process when
100 JACKSON, supra note 25, at 56.
101 See Frances Gibb & James Landale, Straw Faces Humiliation on Jury Trial, THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 28, 2000, at 1.
102 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, at art. 6, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228.
103 GROVE, supra note 26, at vii (citing Lord Alexander of Weedon QC).
104 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 234 (citing, Riley and Vennerd, Triable-Either-Way Cases:
Crown Court or Magistrates' Court?, HORS at 11 (1988)). When the defendant elects a jury trial,
there is no hearing to argue venue, the case simply goes to Crown Court for trial. However, when
the defendant elects a summary trial and the prosecution wishes for a jury trial, the magistrate must
hear all the arguments and decide. The study examined cases where the defendant requested a
summary trial and the prosecution favored a jury trial. In 27 of the 29 cases, the magistrate sided
with the prosecution. Id.
105 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 235.
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they have dropped more serious charges to ensure a defendant is tried summa-
rily."° While a summary trial may give a guilty defendant a lesser sentence, the
greater injustice is that dropping charges essentially deprives the defendant of the
right to elect a jury trial.'0 7
The second overarching cry is that the conviction rate in magistrates' court
is far higher than in Crown Court.'08 As previously stated, in 1998, 98.3% of the
magistrates' court hearings resulted in a conviction and 64% of the Crown Court
cases that went to trial resulted in an acquittal. 09 In cases of theft, there is a dan-
ger of magistrates becoming hardened to the defense of "I just forgot to pay."" 0
There is no question as to why a defendant would wish to have a case heard by a
jury rather than summarily."'
It is also disconcerting that more minorities choose Crown Court over mag-
istrates' court. This could be related to the fact that the "[percentage] of magis-
trates' courts sitting with one member from an ethnic minority is lower than the
35% of juries that contain at least one ethnic minority.""2 It should be no sur-
prise that demeanor, dress, speech, and body language are all factors taken into
consideration when judging the defendant. Defendants of different cultures may
be at a disadvantage in front of white magistrates especially when studies show
magistrates pay careful attention to demeanor and believe they could judge the
106 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 237-38. In the case of Ramsgate Justices, ex parte Warren
et. al., (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 250, the defendant elected a jury trial until the prosecutor dropped the
more serious charges to ensure the case was to be tried summarily. In Canterbury and St.
Augustine's Justices, ex parte Klisiak (1981) 72 Cr. App. R. 250, the police amended the charge to
state that the public damage was £155 instead of the original £414 and therefore warrant a summary
trial. Both of these cases were found to be a misuse of prosecutorial power.
107 Liverpool Stipendiary Magistrate, ex pare Ellison (1990) R.T.R. 220 (noting that a
prosecutor that amends the charge before a mode of trial hearing is within rights and such action is
not considered an abuse of power). In the Liverpool case, the court found that changing the charge
was appropriate when it is changed according to the facts because there was no bad faith by the
prosecutor and no prejudice to the defendant. ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 239.
108 See DAVIES, supra note 7, at 173; see also Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 13, at
42.
109 Id.
110 See Hallett, supra note 16; see also Roger Ede, In Defence of a Trial by Jury, THE TIMES
(London), Law Section, Sept. 8, 1998. Ede cites the celebrated 1980 case of Lady Isobel Barnett
who committed suicide after being found guilty of taking £0.87 worth of food from a shop as an
example as to how important reputation is in the case of petty theft, and why the right to a jury trial
cannot be abridged. The Law Society opposes the elimination of a jury trial in cases of theft because
in cases of theft, a guilty verdict threatens a person's livelihood or reputation. Id.
111 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 245. As Ashworth asserted, the Commission's retort really
missed the main argument. The 1993 Royal Commission that was appointed to study the right to jury
trial election was asked to examine the argument that there is a better chance of acquittal in Crown
Court than in magistrates' court. However, the Commission simply stated the defendant did not have
the right to choose a judge who would give them the most lenient sentence. Id.
112 Id. at 253 (citing ZANDER AND HENDERSON, CROWN COURT STUDY 241 (1993)). Zander
and Henderson's study suggested that minorities and women were well represented in juries in
comparison to their percentage of the population. E. MCLAUGHLIN AND J. MUNCIE, CONTROLLING
CRIME 125 (1996).
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character of defendants." 3 A simple matter of cultural diversity can seriously
undermine the impartiality of justice.
The third area of attention for opponents of the Criminal Justice bill is that
the Governments proposal was not well researched. The 1993 Runciman Com-
mission completely ignored the question of whether magistrates' courts had a
higher conviction rate than Crown Courts." 4 The previous time the Government
reduced TEW offenses, under the 1988 Parliament Act, driving with a suspended
license, taking a car without the owner's consent, common assault and criminal
damage less than £2,000, were changed to summary only offences. The affect
was a mere 6% decrease in Crown Court cases."' If the present bill passes, op-
ponents challenge that by eliminating the defendant's right to elect a trial, justice
will be delayed as the mode of trial hearing will become a "mini-trial.""6 How-
ever no research has been conducted to summarize the affect of mode of trial de-
cisions on the congestion within Crown Court." 7 Neither has anyone taken the
time to study mode of trial decisions and the consequences to the victims of
crime. There are frequent delays in Crown Court that can be exasperating to
witness victims. Crown Court is also a more intimidating arena for victims be-
cause of its formality. If there is a guilty verdict, magistrates' court is far more
likely to award victims with compensation."' Would one court be better than the
other for victims or defendants? Without further research, it remains conjecture.
C. Diplock Trials
The largest single factor in administration of law after all is the personality
of the judge. Leon Green".9
Since we are looking at the benefits and disadvantages between bench trials
and jury trials, it would be remise not to examine the case of Northern Ireland,
where for certain criminal cases, the jury system was replaced with judge only
trials, called Diplock trials. In 1972, Lord Diplock chaired a commission in
Northern Ireland, which proposed non-jury courts in emergency trials. 20  The
commission found Northern Ireland experienced perverse acquittals and jury in-
113 DAvIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 199.
114 See infra note 108.
115 Ashworth, supra note 40, at 249-50 (citing CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES,
para. 6.12 (1989)). One reason the Crown Court cases fell by only 6% was that at the same time as
the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, the National Mode of Trial Guidelines came out for magistrates as a
guidance tool in mode of trial decisions.
116 See Hallett, supra note 16.
117 ASHWORTH, supra note 40, at 250.
118 Id. at 252 (citing C. HEDDERMAN AND D. MOXON, MAGISTRATES' COURT OR CROWN
COURT? MODE OF TRIAL DECISIONS AND SENTENCING 32, HORS 125 (1992)). Crown Court judges
seem less willing to issue compensation orders. The Royal Commission did not make a
recommendation to this observation.
119 JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 25, at xiii.
120 Id. at2.
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timidation in cases connected with terrorist crimes and emergency situations.' 2'
The proposal was immediately adopted, and trials involving firearms, explosives
and petrol bombs were funneled to a trial by a single judge, who was selected
from a group of professional judges instead of a jury. 2 2 These trials are called
the "Diplock Trials" after the commission chairperson, and require that the judge
give a written reason for a conviction. There is an automatic right to appeal
against any conviction or sentence, and a judge can recuse himself if he rules a
confession is inadmissible in voir dire. 23 The main change to the system of jus-
tice in Northern Ireland is simply that there is no jury, otherwise the trial main-
tains its same formal structure. 1
24
Since 1973 when the first Diplock trials began, there have been over 10,000
defendants that have gone through this unique system for English justice. Much
research has been done to examine the Diplock system. In a 1987 review of the
emergency legislation, it was observed that there were no voices of dissent to the
Diplock trials and no wrongful conviction claims. 25 However a survey of cases
from 1973-1979 pointed to a decline in the acquittal rate from 50% to 35%.26
There has also been criticism that the Diplock cases overly rely on confessions. 27
The most comprehensive evaluation of the Diplock trials is John Jackson and
Sean Doran's book, Judge Without Jury. They evaluated and compared forty-
three trials in the Belfast Crown Court, of which seventeen were jury trials and
twenty-six were Diplock trials.
In their observations they noted:
You notice that the absence of the jury transforms a criminal trial by relieving
lawyers of the need to explain out loud what is going on. The judge and the
four barristers sit in a cluster at the front of the court, almost on the same level,
121 Id. at 16. The most recent act in Jackson & Doran's book was the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 with an automatic need for renewal every five years. This book is
a fascinating survey of the Diplock trials and a must read for anyone proposing bench trials to replace
jury trials.
122 Id. at 20. Offenses of common law that were sent to Diplock trials were murder,
manslaughter, riot, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Offenses of statutory law were: wounding with intent, causing grievous bodily harm, robbery,
aggravated burglary, arson, and aggravated crimina, damage. Id.
123 Id. at 24.
124 Id. at 58. The Diplock trials remain adversarial, unlike the European trials where the judge
is the inquisitor. Id. at 61.
125 Id. at 51. The review by Viscount Colville cited a study by the American Bar Association
for this claim. However, the claim was not made. Id.
126 Id. at 33, citing, Boyle, Hardon, & Hillard, Law and State: The Case of Nothern Ireland, 98
(1975). The author's of the survey declined to say judges were becoming case hardened, but rather
that prosecutors were taking greater care in selecting and preparing cases. In 1991 the acquittal rate
for those who plead not guilty and were found not guilty was 43%, in 1992 it was 53% and in 1993 it
was 29%. Id. at 35 Table 2.2.
127 Id. at 91. In Jackson & Doran's sample only four trials had the admissibility of a confession
contested. However Diplock trials had fewer expert witnesses and expert evidence than jury trials.
Id. at 94. Maybe it was the audience, because the barristers who presented the trials all had more
than ten years experience and all twenty-two of the Diplock judges are experienced. Id. at 95.
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conversing with one another in a low, barely audible monotone, checking oral
evidence against prepared documents. Clarity, one of the glories of the English
jury system, is sacrificed to bureaucratic formalism. 21
The lack of formal features enables the trial to be shorter. 129 The judge's
role is to act as the jury, but still remain the judge. Therefore in Diplock trials,
the judge may stop a trial after the prosecution's case not only if he believes no
reasonable jury would convict in the case, but also if "he believes that as the trier
of fact he could not possibly see himself convicting in such a case." 3
Jackson and Doran found the Diplock trials worked' because the judges
were forced to record the circumstances and justifications for their verdict, the
judges were professionally trained and there was an automatic right to appeal.
Diplock trials dealt with serious matters using professional judges, whereas mag-
istrates' court were created to handle more trivial matters; to submit defendants
of more serious matters in magistrates' court would not give defendants quality
justice.'32 If within the English system a crucial evaluation of summary trials has
ruled the proposed Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill guilty of serious injus-
tice, why go forward with such an idea? The answer is money.
IV. BUDGET CONCERNS
When you are the person in the dock, a just result is more important than
what is convenient for the system. Roger Ede'33
The approximate cost of hearing a trial in Crown Court was £3,100 in 1988,
whereas a case directed to magistrates' court then cost a mere £295. ' Crown
Court is approximately ten times the cost of magistrates' court. In 1999, 18,391
defendants elected a trial by jury in TEW cases.' If all these defendants were
referred to magistrates' court rather than Crown Court, the Home Secretary es-
timates he can save the country £105 million.' 36
128 Id. at 89, citing, Laurence Marks, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 26, 1989.
129 Id. at 198.
130 See Id. at 189, discussing Regina v. Hassan and Others, 9 NUB (1981). This test is also
called the Galbraith Test from Regina v Galbraith, I WLR 1039 (198 1). If no reasonable jury could
convict a person after hearing the facts from the prosecution, then the judge may acquit. In Diplock
trials there does not need to be a formal request from the defense to apply this test and argument from
the prosecution, judge simply applies the test. This is again how the trials are cut shorter in Diplock
situations.
131 JACKSON, supra note 25, at 304.
132 Id. at 6.
133 Ede, supra note 110.
134 DAVIES ET. AL., supra note 7, at 173.
135 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 13, at 41. Magistrates directed cases to be heard by
jury trial to Crown Court 44,269 times. We will assume that criterion would not change with the
Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill since magistrates would use the same Mode of Trial Guidelines
to send cases to Crown Court as they use now.
136 Straw On Trial Over Jury Reform, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 1999), available in
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ukpolitics/newsid_527000/527721.stm>. Mr. Straw's figures
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While Mr. Straw was looking for ways to save money, the Treasurer, Mr.
Gordon Brown, was finding ways to spend it. In March, when the budget was
announced for the next four years, Mr. Brown promised to increase the Lord
Chancellor's budget (the courts) from £3.7 billion to £4.3 billion and the Legal
Department from £3.0 billion to £3.3 billion.1 37 Mr. Straw's office was set to
receive a 6.4% increase over the next three years. 38 It is interesting to note that
part of the Home Secretary's expenditure plans in 1999-2000 listed the reduction
of crime as very important since it is 50% higher now than in the 1980's.1
39
Thus it begs the question that when the Home Office, which governs the legal
departments, is receiving such large increases, why this not being passed on to
the prosecutors? It is probably best answered that while the Department of Pub-
lic Prosecutions (DPP) and CPS work with the Home Secretary's Office," 4 they
actually are governed by the Lord Chancellor's office. The March budget pro-
posal did not increase the 2000-2001 budget for the Lord Chancellor's office. 4'
However the final four-year proposal did increase the Lord Chancellor's budget
by £600 million. 42 Unfortunately, the money did not go to the DPP.
While other offices see budget windfalls, the DPP, which CPS falls under,
did not make the list. DPP is facing cuts of more than £12 million for a 4%
budget cut in the next year.143 The Bar's feelings were summed up by Chairman
seem to be calculated from the premise that every defendant that elects a trial by jury has a trial. This
discounts that defendants plead guilty before trial. Mr. Straw's figures do not seem to take into
account the cost of more cases in magistrates' court.
137 Total Public Spending 2000-04, THE TIMES (London), July 19, 2000, at 4m. By all
estimates this figure should only go up as the UK export market was up by 6% in 1999 compared
with the world trade rate of 5%. The predictions are that the UK market will rise to 7.5% in 2000
and 6.5% in 2001. Strong trade allows the UK budget to give generously. Budget 2000: British
Exports Strong & World I, THE TIMES (London), (Mar. 22, 2000), available in <http://www.the-
times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/2000/03/22/timbudbud
01018.html >.
138 How They Cashed In, THE TIMES (London), July 19, 2000, at 4m. This increase is on top
of the original proposed increased announced in March, when it was announced that the Home Office
budget for 1999-2000 was £7.7 billion whereas for 2000-2001 it is £8.1 billion. Budget 2000: Total
Public Spending 2000/2001, THE TIMES (London), (Mar. 22, 2000) available in <http://www.the-
times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/2000/O3/22/timbudbud
02003.html>.
139 THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPENDITURE PLANS 1999-2000 TO 2001-2002, at 14 (1999).
140 The Annual Report by CPS states that a joint committee of all criminal justice system
representatives, Home Secretary's Office, Chancellor's Department and Treasury, have banded
together to make a comprehensive spending proposal. Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 13, at
8.
141 Budget 2000: Total Public Spending 2000/2001, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 2000. The
£8.7 billion from 1999-2000 is the same amount given in 2000-2001.
142 Id. The criminal justice system will receive £245 million but CPS will not see this money.
The Lord Chancellor's office has also given £32 million into high tech improvements for Crown
Courts. Frances Gibb & Roland Watson, Lawyers Fear Cuts Will Aid Criminals, THE TIMES
(London), June 5, 2000, at 1.
143 Frances Gibb & Roland Watson, Lawyers Fear Cuts Will Aid Criminals, THE TIMES
(London), June 5, 2000, at 1. This shortfall comes despite the new preliminary hearings that will
take place in Crown Court rather than magistrates' court for the most serious crimes such as rape,
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Jonathan Hirst, QC, "[i]f cases are not adequately prepared and prosecuted then
this strikes at the heart of the criminal justice system. "'4
The increase in budgets for all departments except CPS does not demon-
strate the Labour government's commitment to fighting a war on crime. Nor
does the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill seem to save the amount of money
that the Home Secretary says he needs. 4 ' As pointed out in the pros and cons,
the defendant does not gain justice by having the summary trial in magistrates'
court. Is this small monetary saving worth the effort?
V. CONCLUSION
Sir William Blackstone warned of changing the nature of the jury trial sys-
tem:
However convenient these may appear at first...let it again be remembered
that delays and inconvenience in the forms of justice are the price that all free na-
tions must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads
upon this sacred bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of
our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually
increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momen-
tous concern. 146
Recently the Marquess of Blandford was charged with shoplifting deodorant
and sunglasses worth £237 at the trendy Knightsbridge shop of Harvey Nichols.
Lord Blandford elected for a jury trial rather than summary trial in magistrates'
court. His five day trial cost the taxpayer approximately £40,000, and the jury
found him not guilty.147 Had Lord Blandford been accused of theft after passage
of the Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill, he would not had the option to choose
a jury trial and the magistrates' judge decision would surely have been a sum-
mary trial. 4" Despite his standing in the community, his guilt or innocence
murder and aggravated assaults. This move will reduce delay up to seven weeks that cases usually
languish in magistrates' court and supposedly save £15.7 million. Frances Gibb, Swifter Justice for
Worst Crimes, THE TIMES (London), July 14, 2000, at 7.
144 See Gibb & Watson, supra note 142, at 1.
145 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 13, at 43. One way to look for financing of the
Crown Court trials is to require guilty defendants to pay the court costs. While this was done in
magistrates' court 53.5% of the time in 1999, Crown Court only did so in 7.3% of its convictions.
Id.
146 GROVE, supra note 26, at 204 (quoting Sir William Blackstone).
147 See Steve Bird, Blandford 'Is Honest About His Dishonesty', THE TIMES (London), Aug.
10, 2000, at 3; Steve Bird, Blandford Trial Jury Clears Him of Shoplifting, THE TIMES (London),
Aug. 12, 2000, at 5. This was not Lord Blandford's first court appearance. He had 21 former
convictions for possession of drugs, theft and forgery. However, the 44 year-old Lord Blandford told
the jury that in the past when he had been charged, he plead guilty right away proving he was honest
about his guilt. Since this string of convictions, Lord Blandford has undergone drug treatment and on
the day he was accused of shoplifting, he had already spent over £700 in Harvey Nichols on luggage.
148 MODE OF TRIAL GUIDELINES, HMSO 6 (1995). Based on the Mode of Trial Guidelines, the
case should be tried summarily unless Lord Blandford needed a higher sentence than magistrates'
court could give out, which would be unlikely, and one of the following took place: there was a
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would have been tried by three lay magistrates' judges. From the statistics cited
earlier, and knowledge of his previous convictions, Lord Blandford probably
would have received a guilty verdict from a summary trial. Justice needs to be
based on individual facts and not on past history or reputation.
Another recent distressing case was the magistrates' court trial of head
teacher (principal) Marjorie Evans. Mrs. Evans was a highly reputable teacher
of 35-years experience when she was found guilty by a stipendiary magistrate of
assaulting of a ten-year-old unruly schoolboy.'49 Mrs. Evans claimed she used a
textbook restraining technique on the boy when he tried to hit her. The only wit-
nesses were the boy and Mrs. Evans, with another teacher stating Mrs. Evans
admitted to hitting the boy. Only on appeal to Crown Court did the subsequent
judge find the unblemished record of Mrs. Evans more credible than the boy,
whose own mother testified that he was difficult to control. 5 However the dam-
age of an initial magistrates' court guilty verdict was done and Mrs. Evans must
request reinstatement to her job.' 5
In looking at budgetary concerns and the cost of jury trials, the government
has decided there is a price for justice. The Criminal Justice Mode of Trial Bill
was first brought up by the Tory government and now introduced into law by the
Labour government, both have deemed money more important than juries. Is
England going down a slippery slope of near total elimination of the jury system?
Only time and money will tell.
breach of trust by a person in a position of substantial authority, the theft was committed in disguise,
the theft was committed by an organized gang, the victim was old of infirm, or the property stolen
was valued higher than £10,000. None of these fit the facts in Lord Blandford's case, thus he would
have been denied a jury trial whether he wanted one or not. His status as the future 12th Duke of
Marlborough would be irrelevant. Mode of Trial Guidelines, HMSO 6 (1995).
149 See Steve Bird & David Charter, Head Cleared of Slapping Unruly Boy, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 1; Steve Bird, How Did a Child's Lies Destroy My Career?, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6; Steve Bird, Boy Branded a Liar Insists He Told the Truth, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6.
150 See Steve Bird & David Charter, Head Cleared of Slapping Unruly Boy, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 1; Steve Bird, How Did a Child's Lies Destroy My Career?, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6; Steve Bird, Boy Branded a Liar Insists He Told the Truth, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6. The magistrates' court was not allowed to hear video evidence that the
boy gave at the police station stating that he was out to get rid of Mrs. Evans. Crown Court
requisitioned the boy and found his testimony to be inconsistent with another boy who claimed to
have witnessed the slap. Mrs. Evans has claimed her innocence all along. She had support of her
fellow teachers and over 300 parents. After the magistrates' verdict, she was given a suspended
three-month jail sentence and fined £2,250 prosecution costs.
151 See Steve Bird & David Charter, Head Cleared of Slapping Unruly Boy, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 1; Steve Bird, How Did a Child's Lies Destroy My Career?, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6; Steve Bird, Boy Branded a Liar Insists He Told the Truth, THE TIMES
(London), Sept. 2, 2000, at 6. Mrs. Evans' ordeal is not over, as it was reported that the police were
still investigating her alleged physical and emotional handling of pupils.
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I. INTRODUCTION
England and several States that were once part of its empire (including the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have, in the twentieth cen-
tury, legislatively waived their common law immunity to certain civil actions
filed by citizens who are seeking to recover damages caused by the negligence of
the State and/or its servants.' This voluntary partial waiver of sovereign immu-
nity now subjects these States to potential liability in an effort to provide the
States' citizens with redress for previously unrecoverable damages. And while it
was the intent of legal reformers to cause these States to be treated in their own
courts in a manner that would be indistinguishable from the treatment accorded to
any other party submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts, nevertheless it is cru-
cial to note that certain public policy considerations continue to prevent the com-
plete abandonment of this doctrinal immunity.
Further, the ever-continuing judicial interpretation of the scope of the
waiver immunity in the respective courts in these countries virtually guarantees
that the delineation of the common law doctrinal defense will continue to evolve
in an effort to better reflect the contemporary social, political, and economic val-
ues peculiar to each dynamic society. This is because each of the aforementioned
countries is working toward an identical goal of securing for its citizens, by
means of the application and transformation of their respective common law in-
terpretations of the scope of the waiver, justice, which has been defined as being
"a matter of the right outcome of the political system: the right distribution of
goods, opportunities, and other resources." 2 Epitomizing the comparative inter-
pretation of the scope of the waiver, a "policy/operational dichotomy" has been
introduced in the respective bodies of common law interpreting the scope of the
waiver of immunity in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand as each of the forgoing has attempted to distinguish which tort liability
actions are justiciable pursuant to their respective waiver efforts and which are
not. It is important to observe that all of the aforementioned States have also
struggled with the same enigma that has plagued the application of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy since the United States Supreme Court first articulated
the delineation in Dalehite v. United States, i.e., the demarcation of where policy
or discretionary considerations (and immunity) end and where operational activi-
ties (and tort liability) begin.3
1 28 U.S.C. § 1346; Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, c. 44, § 2 (U.K.); Crown Liability Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-50 (1952)(Can.); Judiciary Act, 1903, § 64 (Austl.); Crown Proceedings Act ,1950,
§§ 3, 6 (N.Z.).
2 ROLAND DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 404-05 (1986).
3 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
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This article will analyze the common law origins of the defense of sovereign
immunity in the legal systems of England, the United States, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, and it will recognize and address the common, recurring
themes characterizing the waiver of immunity as evidenced in the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy. More importantly, it will demonstrate that the devel-
opment of this distinction is an example of the ever-continuing evolution of the
common law. Finally, a pragmatic mechanism aiding in the resolution of the
policy/operational dilemma in all five of the aforelisted jurisdictions will be sug-
gested and commented upon. The efficacy of this suggestion will justify the con-
clusion that a legal doctrine originating in a germinating body of common law
will uniformly evolve toward the conceptual goal of justice in derivative legal
systems regardless of its development in separate and distinct societies.4
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW
As the common law in England developed its own identity out of a meld of
Roman law and German customs, the resulting body of laws reflected social, po-
litical and economic factors that comprise English societal history. And as Eng-
land and the States sharing its common law heritage continued to develop and
evolve, their bodies of laws have continued to develop with them by perpetually
reflecting and incorporating the evolutions and influences inherent in the growth
of each nation. Because the laws of each respective State are continually devel-
oping and evolving in an attempt to reflect and define the contemporary values
and morals of their society in order to achieve a more perfect sense of justice as
viewed from within each State, Oliver Wendall Holmes expounded his very
Darwinian conclusion that in the landmark American jurisprudential writing, The
Common Law:
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consis-
tency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always
retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.5
Hence, as a society continues to evolve and develop, its common law will
4 This conclusion is based on the presumption that the States possessing these derivative legal
systems will continue to share roughly the same social, political, and economic values.
5 OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881). This statement is consistent with
Holmes' unreconstructed views on social Darwinism on economic issues, and, although he did not
read Darwin until almost 1900, the social theory that pervades his work is an obvious byproduct of
the enormous influence evolutionary theory had upon his thoughts ("evolution was in the air"). Id. at
vi; G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 360 (1993).
Holmes, however, was not the first to expound this view - Professor Julius Stone observed that juris-
prudential philosophers such as Maine in England, Savigny in Germany, and Montesquieu in France
had been considering the effect of social and political influences on the evolution of the law long be-
fore the concept was ever applied to biology or sociology. JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
LAW AND JUSTICE 36 (1966).
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also continue to evolve and develop to reflect this dynamism.6 "As institutions of
the state, courts make authoritative decisions about certain matters presented to
them. The social, political and economic environment influences, perhaps indi-
rectly, the nature of these matters."' Combining with these ancillary societal fac-
tors, the shaping influence of legal precedent, as defined by the doctrine of stare
decisis, in the common law throughout its history is unquestionable. However,
the authority and scope of common law precedent has varied greatly in the differ-
ent legal systems addressed,8 and the continuing evolutionary nature of the com-
mon law has been the subject of debate. As early as the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, legal scholars actively debated whether common law precedent
should continue to expand and evolve to encompass new fact and legal scenarios,
or whether the body of laws existing at that time should be viewed as a form of
optima regula, literally the "best rule" or the "highest rule," which, "after many
successions of ages . . . [had been] fined and refined" so as to form a complete
referential body of legal authority from which all subsequent legal decisions
might be conclusively decided.9
The first dramatic confrontation between these two philosophies took place
in the jurisprudential debate occurring in Calvin's Case, which determined the
validity of a claim of a Scottish born individual to be allowed to inherit real
property in England. "o The former position was advocated by individuals such as
Lord Ellesmere and Edwyn Sandys, who argued that, "new cases happen every
day: no lawe euer was, or euer can be made, that can prouide remedie for all the
future cases, or comprehend all circumstances of humane actions which judges
are to determine."" In rebuttal, lawyers including Sir Edward Coke and Francis
Bacon actively opposed the notion of any further evolution of the law, as Coke
claimed that there was no need for new laws, as "the laws of England are so
copius in this point" 2 that any legal questions might be decided based upon the
law expounded in the then-existing precedent. Further, Bacon suggested that, if
and when a matter of first impression arose, the courts should not "consult of a
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 360, 372 (1990), where Judge
Posner discusses the ever-continuing evolution of the common law in society as a function of the judi-
ciary promoting a "social policy of making markets work."
7 ROSs CRANSTON, LAW, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 45 (1987).
8 DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 24-25. The degree of application of legal precedent within any
given court varies according to the system's adherence to the strict doctrine of precedent or the re-
laxed doctrine of precedent. Whereas the strict doctrine generally requires courts to follow earlier
decisions of similarly situated courts or of courts of superior jurisdiction, the relaxed doctrine of
precedent, "on the other hand, demands only that a judge give some weight to past decisions on the
same issue, that he must follow these unless he thinks them sufficiently wrong to outweigh the initial
presumption in their favor." Id.
9 Keechang Kim, Calvin's Case (1608) and the Law of Alien Status, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 155,
161 (1996).
10 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (H.L. 1608).
11 The arguments of counsel are collected in 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 577
(W. Cobbett et al. eds., 1809). Hence arguments of counsel will be cited to this volume, and this par-
ticular quote is from Id. at 676.
12 Id. at 612.
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law to be made, but to declare the law already planted" 3 and thus should rely on
the already existing legal rules to make their determination. Coke supported this
when he espoused the position that the current law, "as optima regula - was
therefore given an unassailable and transcendental existence which is entirely re-
moved from the actual workings of the judiciary.""
Ellesmere and Sandys' argument that legal precedent must continue to de-
velop in order to deal with new and unforeseen legal questions contributed to
their victory in Calvin's Case.'5 However, the question next arises of why any
given law on any well-considered issue, the parameters of which have been re-
fined and resolved by courts over many years, must continue to evolve into new
and different forms? The answer again lies in the evolution of society. Holmes
noted that, "However much we may codify the law into a series of seemingly
self-sufficient propositions, those propositions will be but a phase in a continuous
growth."' 6 This is true because, as Holmes observed, the law is always ap-
proaching, but never reaching consistency. Because there will always be gaps in
the law, new situations, vagueness, and indeterminacy, the law will become en-
tirely consistent only when it becomes fixed and ceases to grow.
Accordingly, the interpretation of legal precedent must recognize that "law
and legal text are not disengaged from the circumstances of 'the time they were
made.'"7 In order to effectively correspond with and reflect the actual feelings
and demands of the community, the courts' present-day interpretation of histori-
cal precedent must recognize and address the dynamic that exists between the ra-
tionales supported, the historical adoption and growth of the law, and the con-
temporary values and goals sought by the society and governed by the legal
authority applying the precedent. If a contemporary legal authority fails in its
application of precedent to recognize any dissimilarities between the parameters
and goals of the justice, or public policy, sought in the current legal action and
the rationale behind the historical application of the law, the resultant precedent
runs the risk of diverging from the values and goals of justice sought by its soci-
ety. This, in turn, leads to a loss of credibility in the legal systems that govern
the society and risks creating "the greater evil of private retribution"' 8 by people
who, because the law has failed to provide them with a remedy for their injuries,
have been caused to abandon their belief in, and thus their abiding respect for,
the law.' 9
Developments in tort law responsive to socio-economic changes in society
are typified by the contemporary evolution of the defense of sovereign immunity,
13 Id. at 563.
14 Id. at 612; Kim, supra note 9, at 161.
15 Calvin's Case, supra note 10,at 410-11.
16 HOLMES, supra note 4, at 37.
17 Kim, supra note 9, at 162 (quoting Lord Ellesmere).
18 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 41-42.
19 CRANSTON, supra note 6, at 46. "Ostensibly, the operation of the courts is based on the as-
sumption that people know their rights and will take the initiative to enforce them if they expect to be
successful. "
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which reflects a refinement in the common law prompted by the transformation
of societal values with respect to the rights of the individual in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Hence the retrocession of the sovereign immunity defense is
similar to the developments that occurred in the field of workers' compensation
law during the same era:
In the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century, workers might fail
completely in a claim for damages for personal injuries, even if their employer
was clearly at fault, because of the wide defenses the judges evolved - volenti
(that employees had voluntarily assumed the risk), common employment (that the
injuries arose from the negligence of a fellow worker), and contributory negli-
gence. These defenses to a damages claim were given a wide scope 'in order to
ease the employer's financial burden.. . .' Later courts and parliaments gradu-
ally whittled them down in response to the growth of the political power of trade
unions. 20
Likewise, and for similar reasons, sovereign immunity has been whittled
away since the turn of the twentieth century as societies have increasingly recog-
nized the rights of individuals who have sustained injuries as the result of the
negligent acts of the state.
However, it is necessary to refer to the origins of the doctrine in order to
better understand the evolution of the scope of the sovereign immunity.2 Royal
courts in the middle ages first applied the doctrine, and their rationale in adopting
the feudal principle was that a lord could not be sued in his own court. 22 Black-
stone attributed the immunity to the royal prerogative as:
[Tihat special preeminence which the King hath over and above all other per-
sons, and out of the course of the common law, in the right of his royal dig-
nity... The law ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty. [He is] sover-
eign and independent [within his own dominions and] owes no kind of subjection
to any potentate on earth. Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought
against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction
over him, for all the jurisdiction implies superiority of power.23
Edwin Borchard, a professor of law at Yale University in the 1920s, ob-
served that the concept of sovereign immunity developed as a means of promot-
ing the conceptual inviolability of sovereign authority:
20 Id. at 136.
21 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 84 (1991). Interestingly, court opinions serve a diverse function in docu-
menting this historical approach because they espouse the laws and analyses of the era, and they also
serve as a "critical interpreter of and player in historical events, its precedents preserve, illuminate,
and provide a perspective on the nation's social, political, and legal traditions." Also, a court's deci-
sions are "often intertwined with historical events to such an extent that it is not possible to under-
stand those events without considering the precedents contributed to their development." Id.
22 PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 3-4 (2' ed. 1989).
23 Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924) (quoting I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 239, 241-2).
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Chitty adds that 'the inviolability of the King is essential to the existence of
his powers as supreme magistrate; and therefore his person is sacred. The law
supposes it impossible that the King himself can act unlawfully or improperly. It
cannot distrust him whom it has invested with the supreme power; and visits on
his advisors and ministers the punishment due to the illegal measures of the gov-
ernment. Hence the legal apothegm that the King can do no wrong.' Nothing
seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the
King's courts was purely personal.24
Accordingly, in response to claims for damages for the negligence of the
government, the courts denied relief and cited the maxim that "the King can do
no wrong" as grounds for declaring nonsuit. They held in this manner despite the
fact that the same courts had applied the aforementioned maxim since the Middle
Ages to produce virtually the contrary result. 2 In fact, this maxim was misun-
derstood even by Blackstone and Coke ,26 who either did not recognize its impli-
cation or instead consciously disregarded its original meaning, "that the King was
not privileged to do wrong."27 In medieval England, the King was not regarded
as being above the law; on the contrary, he was regarded as under a duty - an
unenforceable duty, to be sure - to give the same redress to a subject whom he
had wronged as his subjects were bound to give to each other. It was the notion
that the King was, by and large, subject to the same law as his subjects which
caused the petition of right, which made a legal claim against the King, to be
marked off from other petitions to the King by aggrieved subjects.28
The petition of right, a proceeding in Chancery by which a subject might
recover property in the possession of the king, could be utilized for the enforce-
ment of contractual rights.29  Equitable relief was also available against the
Crown pursuant to the filing of a petition, but its application did not extend to
torts."° Nevertheless, injured subjects were not necessarily without redress, be-
cause in many (but not all) cases, an action in tort could be brought against a
Crown servant in his individual capacity, and the Crown would usually defend
the action and pay the damages. 3
The petition of right also proved unsatisfactory as a procedural vehicle. Al-
though the procedure was simplified in England by the Petitions of Right Act of
1860, the petition was limited in that it was subject to the Crown's consent by
24 Id. (quoting CHITTY, THE LAW OF ROYAL PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 5 (1820)).
25 HOGG, supra note 22, at 6.
26 Kim, supra note 8, at 161. Interestingly, Coke was also of the opinion that the laws of Eng-
land had reached the stage of optima regula, as opposed to leges temporis, after having been refined
"in many successions of ages." Id. Thus, Coke's own revisionary interpretation of the maxim is
immediately and ironically undercut by the fact that his own interpretation of the meaning was a
variation from past interpretation and precedent.
27 Borchard, supra note 23, at 2, n. 2.
28 HOGG, supra note 22, at 4.
29 In Thomas v. The Queen, 10 Q.B. 31 (1874), it was held that the petition of right lay to re-
cover from the Crown unliquidated damages for breach of contract. See HOGG, supra note 22 at 6.
30 HOGG, supra note 22, at 6.
31 Id.
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endorsing the petition fiat justitiae - " let right be done. "32 "Of course, by 1860
responsible government was fully developed, so that the discretion to grant or
deny the royal fiat was in reality the discretion of the cabinet. In short, the gov-
ernment could only be sued if it consented to be sued. "3' By that time, however,
the public law of England had already migrated to its colonies, and the strained
law of Crown liability, along with the rest of the English common law legal sys-
tem, had been installed in the various colonies as part of the foundation of their
own embryonic legal systems. 4 Accordingly, England's colonial governments
adopted the petition of right as the procedure for suing the States in tort, and "af-
ter the advent of responsible government, each colonial government enjoyed the
privilege of granting or denying the royal fiat when faced with a lawsuit. Each
colonial government became immune from liability in tort. "35 Thus, while most
European states had long admitted liability in such cases by the nineteenth cen-
tury, 36 England and its colonial offspring continued to uphold and defend the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity within their respective legal systems to the detriment
of their own citizens' legal interests. Thus when Justice Miller of the United
States Supreme Court observed in Gibbons v. United States37 that "no govern-
ment has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches or unau-
thorized exercise of power by its officers or agents," he presumably was talking
about States deriving their common law legal systems from England.
Indeed, English constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey went so far as to suggest
32 Id. at 7.
33 Id.
34 While the English common law is the primary source for the majority of the United States'
initial body of common law precedent, the Supreme Court noted in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
294 n.36 (1947), that:
[I]t must not be overlooked that many [of the individual States] have been deeply influ-
enced by Roman and civil law to which their history exposed them. None of the terri-
tory west of the Alleghenies was more than briefly or casually subject to common law
before the Revolution. French civil law prevailed in most of the Ohio and Mississippi
Valleys from their settlement until Wolfe's decisive victory before Quebec in 1763. Its
ascendancy in the north then was broken, and in 1803 the Louisiana Purchase ended
French sovereignty in the rest of the Mississippi area. Louisiana continues, however,
a system of law based on the Code Napoleon. The Southwest and Florida once were
Spanish.
See also Colvin, Participation of the United States of America with the Republics of Latin America in
the Common Herotage of Roman and Civil Law, 10 Proceedings of the Eighth American Scientific
Congress 46.
[Further,] in New York there was a deep and persistent influence from Roman-Dutch
law. Upon capitulation of New Amsterdam, it was stipulated that certain Dutch law,
and judgments and customs should be respected. But even beyond this, in the organi-
zation of the courts the Dutch rule persisted although contrary to the 'Duke's Laws'
enacted by the conquer . . . . The Roman-Dutch element in New York law is recog-
nized by its courts.
E.g., Dunham v. Williams, 37 N.Y. 251, 253; Van Giessen v. Bridgford, 83 N.Y. 348, 356; Smith v.
Rentz, 131 N.Y. 169, 175, 30 N.E. 54, 56.
35 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7.
36 Borchard, supra note 21, at 2.
37 Gibbons v. United States 75 U.S. 269, 274 (1868)
INTRA-STATE TORT LIABILITY
that no preference or disparity of treatment really existed at the turn of the twen-
tieth century in England when he posited, "Why should the government be
treated differently in the matter of liability from any other legal person?" 3" Dicey
supported his position by noting that, in Britain, "every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibil-
ity for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen." However,
"Dicey disregarded the fact that in English law at that time the Crown, legally
the embodiment of the central government, enjoyed extensive immunities from
being sued in tort, even if officials did not."39
In response to the injustice caused by the application of the doctrine in the
twentieth century, Borchard noted that the "rule of law" extolled by Dicey was
flawed in that:
[Ilt requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-
American law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all risks of a defective,
negligent, perverse or erroneous administration of the State's functions, an un-
just burden which is becoming graver and more frequent as the government's ac-
tivities become more diversified and as we leave to administration officers in an
even greater degree the determination of the legal relations of the individual citi-
zen.
40
Accordingly, Borchard argued in favor of abolishing the affirmative defense
and summarized the sentiments of legal reformers when he declared, prior to the
United States' adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1944, that:
there is no reason why the most flagrant of injuries wrongfully sustained by the
citizen, those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed to rest, as they
now generally do, in practice if not in theory, at the door of the unfortunate citi-
zen alone. This hardship becomes the more incongruous when it is realized that
it is greatest in countries like Great Britain and the United States, where democ-
racy is assumed to have placed the individual on the highest plane of political
freedom and individual justice.41
Borchard opined that, "The reason for this long-continued and growing
injustice in Anglo-American law rests, of course, upon a medieval English theory
that 'the King can do no wrong,' which without sufficient understanding was in-
troduced into the common law of this country, and has survived mainly by reason
of its antiquity."42 Thus while the disparate treatment afforded to States based
38 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193 (10t'
ed. 1959)
39 UNITED KINGDOM NAT'L COMM. COMP. LAW, Governmental Liability: A Comparative
Study, 13 U.K. COMP. LAW SERIES 2 (John Bell & Anthony W. Bradley eds. 1991).
40 Borchard, supra note 23, at 1.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2. Holmes' jurisprudence supports this position when he also noted that:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.
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upon the anachronistic legal philosophy espoused by Justice Miller in Gibbons,
was potentially at odds with the society that it was purported to benefit, neverthe-
less the courts respecting and applying the common law doctrine continued to
uphold, sustain and expand it.
While judicial activists have sought to utilize the law as a means of social
control and as an instrument to effect social change,43 Holmes has concluded that,
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with
the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.""
Further, he observed that,
[I]n substance the growth of law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than
that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is leg-
islative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely men-
tion, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws
all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for
the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by liti-
gation is in fact and at the bottom the result of more or less definitely understood
views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and tradi-
tions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convic-
tions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
45
Thus, the common law is not only an instrument for effecting social change,
it is a mechanism through which the courts implicitly articulate, legitimize, and
codify the evolution of a society's social, political, and economic values.46
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought
of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and
then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters
on a new career.
HOLMES, supra note 5, at 5.
While he was not addressing the current state of the common law evolution of the doctrinal de-
fense of sovereign immunity when he penned this statement, nevertheless Holmes generally supports
Borchard's argument in favor of the abolition of the doctrine based upon his averment that the origi-
nal rationales supporting the doctrine had become obscure and inapplicable (also, Holmes drafted the
essays comprising THE COMMON LAw approximately fifty years prior to the printing of Borchard's
critical article, and thus could not possibly comment on same). Finally, he noted that, in the growth
of the common law:
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing
precedents. But just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier
creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the
use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. The re-
sult of following them must often be failure and confusion from the merely logical
point of view.
Id. at 35.
43 CRANSTON, supra note 7, at 32.
44 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 41.
45 Id. at 35-36.
46 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes' dissenting opinion went so
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In contrast to Holmes' socio-evolutionary theory of law, contemporary legal
philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin have argued that a society's law is com-
prised and defined by its rules, policies, and principles.47 These standards are
determined by the "popular morality" of a society, and they are shaped by the
"opinions about justice and other political and personal virtues that are held as
matters of personal conviction" by the majority of that society.4" Dworkin ex-
plains that the "moral traditions" of a society are comprised of its popular moral-
ity as viewed:
[O]ver some sizeable historic period including the present ... [and t]he distinc-
tion is then fairly straightforward between these ideas and the community's law.
Its law belongs to the community not just passively, because its members hold
certain views about what is right or wrong, but as a matter of active commit-
ment, because its officials have taken decisions that commit the community to
the rights and duties that make up the law.49
An empirical study of a society's moral traditions in addition to its contem-
porary rules will yield, according to Dworkin, the law of a society as defined by
its moral standards and legal commitments - the law as integrity.50
Dworkin's conception of law can be likened to, but yet it is still conceptu-
ally distinct from, the jurisprudential theories of legal positivism5 and natural
law.52 Determining and defining a society's law as integrity through a study of
its moral traditions and contemporary legal rules supposes that an informed em-
pirical study of a society's moral principles and contemporary legal rules will
yield a uniquely correct answer to the question of what the law is in a hard case.
Judges are to determine the one right answer in a hard case from both the histori-
far as to refer to judges as "interstitial" legislators. See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921).
47 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
48 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 97.
49 Id.
50 ld. at 95-96, 97.
51 Dworkin, supra note 47 describing the key tenets of "legal positivism" as:
The law of a community is a set of special rules used by the community directly or in-
directly for the purpose of determining which behavior will be punished or coerced by
the public power . . . .The set of these rules is exhaustive of "the law", so that if
someone's case is not clearly covered by a rule (because there is none that seems ap-
propriate, or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for some other reason) then the
case cannot be decided by applying "the law." It must be decided by some official,
like a judge, "exercising his discretion," which means reaching beyond the law for
some other sort of standard .... To say that someone has a "legal obligation" is to say
that his case falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or forbear from doing
something.
DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 33.
52 John FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 280 (1980). John Finnis has defined
.natural law" as "the set of principles of practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human
community." H.L.A. Hart noted that the classical theory of natural law is "that there are certain
principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must
conform if it is to be valid." HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 186 (2" ed. 1997),
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cal and contemporary application of legal rules in a society and from their deriva-
tion from the values characterizing that society. Further, Dworkin's definition of
law suggests that an empirical review of a State's moral history as well as its
contemporary common law will yield a determinate concept of law for that soci-
ety. The law revealed in such an empirical review would represent the pure law
53
relative to such a society, and this concept is similar to (but also distinguishable
from) natural law theory because "the set of principles of practical reasonable-
ness in ordering human life and human community" in Dworkin's theory would
recognize particularly societal (as opposed to universal) values.
Thus, Dworkin is bent on defining a society's law as a series of standards
deriving their legitimacy from certain moral and philosophical judgments that
have occurred and developed in the history of the society through and including
the present time. He is not unlike Holmes in that he recognizes the effect of so-
cietal influences on law. But he is unlike Holmes in that Dworkin defines the
law in retrospect based upon the history of society while Holmes postulated that a
society's law is more contemporaneously redefined as its courts' rulings react to
and reflect the dynamic political, social and economic influences on society. The
rise and fall of governments, as well as a society's interactions with neighboring
States, affect and shape a State's historical development, and fortune, coinci-
dence, and other innumerable external and internal influences are decisive shap-
ing factors in its historical development. In response to these unforeseeable and
chaotic developments, a society and its law react by changing and evolving in
unpredictable ways to develop and cope with new conditions and challenges. As
Holmes observed, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. "54
Holmes' definition of the law is predicated upon his judicial experience in
applying laws during the chaotic evolution of society. Dworkin recognizes that a
rival to his theory of law as integrity, and to legal positivism, is "legal realism,"
a semantic theory that the law, as defined by lawyers, is a prediction of what any
particular judge will do in a case." Holmes very much epitomizes this theory of
predictability when he specifies that, "The prophesies of what the courts will
do... are what I mean by the law."56 He is, at best, agnostic about whether any
enduring standards might exist, and, even if they do, whether they have any rele-
vance to the law. While cynical in outlook, attorneys who have plead cases be-
fore a litany of judges will attest that Holmes' candid description of the law is not
53 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 407. "Present law gropes toward pure law when modes of deci-
sion appear that seem to satisfy fairness and process and bring law closer to its own ambition." He
also notes that, "Sentimental lawyers cherish an old trope: they say that law works itself pure. The
figure imagines two forms or stages of the same system of law, the nobler form latent in the less no-
ble, the impure, present law gradually transforming itself into its own purer ambition, haltingly to be
sure, with slides as well as gains, never worked finally pure, but better in each generation than the
last. There is matter in this mysterious image, and its adds to both the complexity and the power of
the law as integrity." Id. at 400.
54 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 1.
55 DwORKIN, supra note 2, at 36.
56 Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
VOL. 29:1
INTRA-STATE TORT LIABILITY
necessarily apocryphal and that, while Dworkin's theory of adjudication tells
judges how they should decide cases, the outcome of any particular litigation of-
ten very much depends to a degree upon the subjective discretionary judgment of
the judge who is entrusted on meting out justice. Thus for Holmes, if a society's
laws are going to accurately correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong, those laws have to contemporaneously
evolve as society's dynamic social, political, and economic values change
(whether for good or not). This is not true for Dworkin: the significant role he
assigns to morality in his jurisprudence limits the extent to which transformations
in the law could legitimately be induced by current social mores alone.
An example of the law evolving to reflect the changing values of society as
theorized by Holmes is found in the English House of Lords' treatment of the
common law duty of an occupier of land toward trespassers. In 1929 the House
of Lords set forth the rule, in Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dunbeck, that an
occupier owed no duty of care to a trespasser on his land, but was only liable for
causing him harm recklessly or deliberately.5 7 In 1972 the House of Lords revis-
ited the issue in Herrington v. British Railways Board and, in developing a new
rule, the court had to establish a proper balance between property rights of the
occupier and the need to protect people against injury.58 Because the trespasser
was an unwanted and uninvited intruder on the land who forced a relationship
upon the occupier, it was considered unfair to impose on the latter the same duty
as he owed to the people he permitted to come on to his land. The only duty
owed was to act as a 'humane man' would do, given his knowledge of the likeli-
hood of trespassers and of any danger there might be on the premises.59
Lord Pearson observed in Herrington, inter alia, that a change in the law
was necessitated by "changed social conditions with more people living in towns
and a lack of open spaces, so that trespassing, especially by children, was more
likely than before."60 A number of other Lordships "stressed that a new rule was
necessary to accommodate changed social attitudes about the duties property
owners owed to trespassers. "61 It is argued that the decision of the House of
Lords in Herrington reflects an even more dramatic evolution in the social
awareness of English law. Herrington evidences the House of Lords', and thus
the law's, recognition of English society's continuing reevaluation of the relative
importance of an occupier's rights and dities relating to real property versus the
intrinsic value of human life. The original non-liability to trespassers rule drew
much of its strength from the unfairness of making landowners owe duties (such
as warning, fencing, guarding, etc.) to uninvited and unwelcome trespassers.
However, the House of Lords' reconsideration of the fairness of imposing such
duties in light of the injuries sustained as the direct result of such a policy evi-
dences the law's continuing reevaluation of individuals' rights versus the protec-
57 Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd. v. Dunbeck, 1929 App. Cas. 358.
58 Herrington v. British Railways Board, 1972 App. Cas. 877.
59 JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 62 (1983).
60 Id. at 61.
61 Id.
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tion of the general welfare as it is currently conceived and valued. Accordingly,
the evolution of the English law concerning the duty of care an occupier owes to
a trespasser is not based upon any optima regula, but rather it is predicated upon
the ever-evolving social, political, and economic conditions that define any par-
ticular era.
Holmes observed that, "The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing
lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done,
and those in which he is not."'6 Those "dividing lines" were based upon policy
reasons and, according to Holmes, what is generally expedient for the community
taken as a whole. So what are the social, political, and economic policy argu-
ments that have been, and still are, accepted by the legal systems in England and
its jurisprudential legatees in their continuing partial common law sustention of
the doctrinal immunity? Further, what arguments have been offered in rebuttal
by legal reformers in the twentieth century as they have sought to mollify the
disparate treatment inflicted upon the populace by the doctrine? Finally, which
universal legal, sociological, and political factors have caused the five nations
under consideration to reach similar conclusions regarding the continued applica-
tion of the doctrine?
Public authorities proffer many public policy6 3 arguments in favor of the
preservation of the doctrine. One such argument is the protection of the public
treasury,6 a rationale that is predicated upon the philosophy that the government
exists for the benefit of the community and cannot lose all of its wealth or the
general public will suffer.' The origins of this argument can be traced back to
the time of the initial fragmentation of England's colonial empire.' And, it has
been proffered in the United States by no lesser authority than the Supreme
Court, which, in the same vein of utilitarianism, noted in Robertson v. Si-
chel,"[The Government] does not guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of
its officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its op-
erations, in endless embarrassments and difficulties, which would be subversive
of the public interests.'67 It is still proffered in the United States as an argument
against increasing the scope of any waiver of immunity in order to prevent dam-
age to the public interests. This theory is evident in the State of Utah's Report of
the Governmental Immunity Committee iii, wherein the committee noted that,
"Supporters of the doctrine believe it is a necessary one to prevent diversion of
62 HOLMES, supra note 5, at 79.
63 CRANSTON, supra note 7, at ix. "Public policy is an ill-defined term. As used in legal dis-
course, it indicates the non-doctrinal factors which may be used in some judicial decision making...
it connotes the 'product' of state decision and action, in other words the decisions and actions of gov-
ernment departments and agencies, courts, and other bodies able to allocate values authoritatively in
society."
64 JAMES HUFFMAN, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY AND DISASTER MITIGATION 451 (1986).
65 BELL, supra note 59, at 2.
66 Russel v. Devon County, 2 T.R. 667 (H.L. 1788)(wherein the Court noted, in an act of clas-
sical utilitarianism, that, "it is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to be inconven-
ienced").
67 Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515, 8 S.Ct. 1286 (1886).
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funds from needed public expenditures to the compensation of individuals. "I
Additional arguments proffered in support of maintaining the scope of im-
munity include: the avoidance of disruption in public services and risk to public
safety;69 the potential negative or defensive effect on legislative and/or adminis-
trative policy decisions based upon the threat of potential tort liability;7' the
avoidance of public embarrassment, negative publicity, and other public rela-
tions-related difficulties resulting from any adverse legal actions;' and the eco-
nomic distinction deriving from the recognition that government, unlike private
enterprise, exists only to serve the public and not to derive a profit. 72 This last
argument suggests that sovereign States should not be subject to the same eco-
nomic costs and penalties 73 that might be inflicted upon other, profit-oriented
market operators.
Legal authorities arguing for reducing the scope of government immunity
have responded to the referenced arguments by proffering alternative arguments
seeking to eviscerate the rationales proffered in support of the doctrine. In rebut-
tal to the previously discussed economic identity argument, legal scholars have
responded that since the public purpose undertaken by the State involves an in-
jury-producing activity, any resulting injuries or damages should be viewed as
part of the overall economic cost of the public enterprise, and not simply as an
additional, ancillary cost. 74 Additionally, it has been argued that it is far better to
distribute the cost of government-caused injuries among the beneficiaries of the
government actions than to impose them in their entirety on innocent victims.
Further, while the government does not profit from its activities, the taxpayers do
and thus they should have to bear the cost of government liability.75 Finally, it
has been argued that ordinary private tort suits that might be brought against the
government generally do not involve any attempt to control government activity76
and should instead serve as an impetus for the government, acting in a manner
similar to comparably situated private actors, to act in a reasonable manner so as
to avoid injury to innocent third parties.'
Accordingly, if Holmes was correct when he posited:
every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at the
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy;
most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious re-
sult of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less
68 State of Utah's Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee iii.
69 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
70 BELL, supra note 59, at 2.
71 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
72 Id.
73 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THlE LAW (2n' ed. 1977).
74 HUFFMAN, supra note 64, at 451.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 451, 514-15 (wherein Learned Hand's theory of tort liability is discussed in terms of
economic reasonableness and efficiency).
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traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis, 78
then it would follow that the public policy arguments set forth above and
proffered in support of, and in opposition to, the ever-continuing efforts to de-
lineate scope of sovereign immunity as a bar to individual recovery in contempo-
rary society must reflect the unsettled and diverse social, political, and economic
values of the society espousing those opinions. And if Dworkin's definition of
justice within a society ("a matter of the right outcome of the political system:
the right distribution of goods, opportunities, and other resources") is correct,
then the difficulties encountered by courts as they attempt to delineate, by means
of the common law, the contemporary scope of sovereign immunity so as to
promote justice by making the law reflect the values of society, the incongruities
in the common law must reflect the society's continuing struggle to achieve a
consensus of social, political, and economic values.
The Historical Development and Current Delineation of the Pol-
icy/Operational Dichotomy in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand
A. The United States
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), authorizes suits against
the United States for damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred." The Act also sets forth that the United States shall be liable with respect
to tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. ""
The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act is set forth in great
detail in the majority opinion authored by Justice Reed in Dalehite v. United
States.8° Briefly summarized, the opinion observes that the Seventy-Ninth Con-
gress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 after nearly thirty years of
Congressional consideration. Justice Reed noted that the Act was intended to
provide an efficient means for individuals to obtain redress for the torts of its
agents, and "It was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume
the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out
its work. ""' He further noted, in a footnote to the opinion, that:
Certain tentative experiments in this direction should be noted. In 1855, Con-
gress established the Court of Claims and consented to suit therein on claims
78 HOLMES, supra note 56.
79 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).
80 Dalehite, supra note3.
81 Id. at 24.
VOL. 29:1
INTRA-STATE TORT LIABILITY
based on contract or federal law or regulation. This consent was enlarged in
1887 to include all cases for damages not sounding in tort. At the same time
United States District Courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of claims up to
$10,000. In 1910, Congress consented to suits in the Court of Claims for patent
infringement. When the Government took over the operation of the railroads
during the First World War, Congress made the United States subject to the
same responsibility for property damage, personal injury, and death as the pri-
vate owners would have been. In 1920 and 1925, the Government consented to
suits in the district courts upon admiralty and maritime torts involving govern-
ment vessels, without limitation as to amount.
From the Committee hearings we learn that the previous 85 years had witnessed
a steady encroachment upon the originally unbroken domain of sovereign immu-
nity from legal process for the delicts of its agents. Yet a large and highly im-
portant area remained in which no satisfactory remedy had been provided for the
wrongs of government officers or employees, the ordinary "common law" type
of tort, such as personal injury or property damage caused by the negligent op-
eration of an automobile. 2
However, it was not Congress' intention to waive the sovereign immunity of
the United States in all respects. The United States can be sued only to the extent
that it has waived its sovereign immunity,83 and the party asserting a cause of ac-
tion against the government has the burden of proving an unequivocal waiver of
immunity." Congress intentionally and specifically excepted several classes of
tort claims from being actionable under the Act, including, inter alia, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a), which specifies that the Act shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused.'
Perhaps Judge Edward R. Becker of the United States District Court, East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, most articulately explained the rationale underlying
this exception in his opinion in Blessing v. United States." According to Judge
Becker, § 2680(a) prevents: tort actions from becoming a vehicle for judicial in-
82 Id. at 25, n. 10. It is interesting to contrast the very different tone of this statement with that
evidenced by Justice Miller almost a century earlier in Gibbons v. United States. Gibbons, supra
note 7. This radical reevaluation of policy reflects the changes that occurred in the United States be-
tween the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the law's emphasis shifted from ideal rule utilitarian-
ism to individual rights and liberties.
83 United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
84 Baker v. United States, 817 F. 2d 560, 562 (91' Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204
(1988).
85 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
86 Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
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terference with decision making that is properly exercised by other branches of
the government and of protecting "the government from liability that would seri-
ously handicap efficient government operations" (Citations omitted). Statutes,
regulations, and discretionary functions, the subject matter of § 2680(a), are, as a
rule, manifestations of policy judgments made by the political branches. In our
tripartite governmental structure, the courts generally have no substantive part to
play in such decisions. Rather, the judiciary confines itself-or, under laws such
as the FTCA's discretionary function exception, is confined-to adjudication of
facts based on discernible objective standards of law. In the context of tort ac-
tions, with which we are here concerned, these objective standards are notably
lacking when the question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but
political practicability, not reasonableness but economic expediency. Tort law
simply furnishes an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political
or economic decisions.
In creating the discretionary function exception, Congress expressed its in-
tention that activities undertaken by agents of the United States that resulted in
injury to the populace would not be actionable under the Act if they occurred in
the direct implementation of a statutory or regulatory policy. The existence of a
duty of care that might be owed by the government authority is not even ad-
dressed, because the issue becomes moot if immunity for the conduct in question
has not been specifically waived. Thus when the statute dictates that claims
predicated upon, "an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercis-
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation ... or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty," the result is that these types of activities simply become non-
justiciable because they are still barred by sovereign immunity. Thus, garden-
variety negligence actions such as those deriving from the careless operation of
an automobile are actionable, but claims for damages attributable to the opera-
tional application of discretionary policy decisions regulating or governing the
type or maintenance schedule of the government automobile in question afford no
such recourse.87
Justice Reed discussed the nature and scope of the exceptions delineated in §
2680(a) in extensive detail in Dalehite, which involved multiple large claims for
damages against the United States arising out of an explosion of ammonium ni-
87 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 n. 7 (1991), the Supreme Court explained the
rationale for this distinction:
There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government agent that are
within the scope of his employment but not within the discretionary function exception
because these acts cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory re-
gime seeks to accomplish. If one of the officials involved in this case drove an auto-
mobile on a mission connected with his official duties and negligently collided with an-
other car, the exception would not apply. Although driving requires the constant
exercise of discretion, the official's decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be
said to be grounded in regulatory policy.
Id. at 325 n.7.
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trate fertilizer which had been produced and distributed under the direction of the
United States for export to devastated areas occupied by the Allied Armed Forces
after World War II. The majority opinion concluded that the allegedly negligent
acts of the government in loading and storing the fertilizer were governmental
duties protected by the discretionary function exception and held the action was
barred by § 2680(a). Describing the discretion protected by § 2680(a) as "the
discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judg-
ment of the best course,""8 the Court also noted that:
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends.
It is enough to hold, as we do, that the 'discretionary function or duty' that can-
not form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initia-
tion of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by execu-
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of
operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is dis-
cretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the opera-
tions of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.89
Thus the majority determined that all of the alleged tortious conduct attrib-
uted to the Government by the plaintiffs fell within the discretionary penumbra of
the exception, as opposed to determining that at some point during the implemen-
tation of the policies in question the activities became operational in scope. This
decision recognized that policy considerations implemented in the form of discre-
tionary activities could extend throughout the operational implementation of a
government function, and the policy/operational dichotomy was thus predicated
upon the way that a particular activity was interpreted by the courts. The distinc-
tion thus appears to be based almost entirely on semantic arguments based upon
subjective interpretations of the law in light of Congress' articulated intent in
passing the Act. This semantic nature of the distinction is observed in Dalehite
when the reader notes that the dissenting justices' opinion disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion after applying the distinction, and the dissent supported its
contrary determination with the same facts."° The problem was, and continues to
be, that the policy/operational dichotomy suggests no clear delineation between
the two positions so as to provide guidance for jurists making this problematic
determination.
The Supreme Court readdressed the policy/operational dichotomy 9' in its
opinion in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Vicao Aerea Grandense (Varig Air-
lines). The Varig Court noted that:
As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define with preci-
88 Dalehite, supra note 3, at 34.
89 Id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted).
90 Id. at 57-58.
91 See also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122 (1955), Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). The
Supreme Court has also addressed the dichotomy in its opinions in these cases/
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sion every contour of the discretionary function exception. From the legislative
and judicial materials, however, it is possible to isolate several factors useful in
determining when the acts of a Government employee are protected from liabil-
ity by § 2680(a). First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of
the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a
given case. As the Court pointed out in Dalehite, the exception covers '[niot
only agencies of government . . . but all employees exercising discretion.' 92
Thus, the basic inquiry concerning the application of the discretionary func-
tion exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employee-
whatever his or her rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to
shield from tort liability. 93
The Varig Court did not present a bright line test that would determine what
behaviors constituted policy or operational conduct, and it instead simply deline-
ated who might be an agent of the government when the determination is being
considered. Further, since the rank of the government agent is not relevant to
the determination of whether the activity in question might be discretionary in
nature, the discretionary function exception arguably extends through every as-
pect of the operational implementation of a policy.
In Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that the discre-
tionary exception only covers acts that "involv[e] an element of judgment or
choice," and so, when properly construed, it "protects only government actions
and decisions based upon considerations of public policy. "9 Three years later,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Gaubert mandated that:
Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation mandates particu-
lar conduct, and the employee obeys the direction, the Government will be pro-
tected because the action will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led
to the promulgation of the regulation. If the employee violates the mandatory
regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for
choice and the action will be contrary to policy. On the other hand, if a regula-
tion allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a
strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves
consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regula-
tions. 9
Accordingly, the Gaubert Court expanded its holding in Varig, and held that
a discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in
that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions.'
Day-to-day management of banking affairs, like the management of other busi-
nesses, regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses
92 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Vicao Aerea Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
104 S. Ct. 2755, 81 L. Ed. 660 (1984).
93 Id.
94 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 81 L. Ed.2d 531 (1988).
95 Gaubert, supra note 87.
96 Id. at 325
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is the wisest.' Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning
level. "[Ilt is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that
governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case."98
It is also important to note that the Vaig Court further observed that an un-
derlying basis for the inclusion of the discretionary functions exception in the Act
was that:
Congress wished to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort. By fashioning an exception for discre-
tionary governmental functions, including regulatory activities, Congress took
"steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap ef-
ficient government operations. ""
By noting that it was Congress' legislative intent to prevent the courts from
usurping the legislative and executive roles of promoting social, economic, and
political policy, the Supreme Court declared its recognition that the exemption
was a legitimate means for retaining and applying the affirmative defense of sov-
ereign immunity in certain situations. However, implicit in this statement is the
notion that, in their judicial decisions, the courts shall interpret and apply this ex-
ception in a spirit the courts determine to be consistent with the intent of Con-
gress in creating the exception. Thus attributing the interpretation to enabling
and protecting the social, economic, and political policy intentions of the drafters
of the Act may now legitimize any contemporary common law elucidation of ex-
emption provided by § 2680(a). Accordingly, because the language of the Act
and the circumstances of any subsequent case applying same are viewed in light
of the then-existing social, political, and economic values held by the court con-
sidering the case, the contemporary interpretation of the scope of the exemption
provided by the Act (and thus the scope of the defense of sovereign immunity)
allows for, and legitimizes, the ever-continuing evolution of the common law de-
lineation of the scope of the waiver.
B. England
In England, the petition of right remained the sole mechanism available to
individuals for suing the Crown in tort until 1947. The Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947 abolished the petition of right, including the requirement of the fiat, and
allowed individual citizens to sue the Crown in the same fashion as they might
another private party."o Further, although modified forms of redress were avail-
able against the Crown's agent in tort, the Crown Proceedings Act was the first
legal authority to impose general tortious liability upon the Crown "in respect of
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Varig).
99 S.A. Empresa, supra note 92, at 814.
100 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7.
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torts committed by its servants or agents." 101
Section 2 of the Crown Proceedings Act defines the scope of the waiver of
immunity, and, in pertinent part, it declares that:
[T]he Crown shall be subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a
private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject:
- in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents;
- in respect of any breach of those duties which a person owes to his ser-
vants at common law by reason of being their employer; and
- in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to the
ownership, occupation, possession or control of property. 02
However, unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act, no statutory provision is
made in the Crown Proceeding Act providing for the exclusion of discretionary
functions or duties on the part of a government authority from the waiver of im-
munity. Instead, this policy-oriented case law limitation on the waiver has been
shaped by the courts, which consider whether the injuries sustained were foresee-
able, whether the parties were sufficiently proximate, and, if so, whether it is
fair, just and reasonable to impose upon the public authority a duty of care in the
discharge of its responsibilities to the individuals claiming that they are entitled to
damages from the authority as the result of its activities. 3
In an effort to delineate which torts attributable to the government may be
actionable, the policy/operational dichotomy emigrated from the United States to
the English legal system.'t ', The policy issue was originally recognized in the
House of Lords' opinion in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, in
which Lord Romer summarized the issue of whether a government authority had
acted reasonably was "a question involving the consideration of matters of policy
and sometimes the striking of a just balance between the rival claims of economy
and thrift."" ° The House of Lords first addressed the dichotomy, although not
explicitly, in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office, when Lord Diplock recog-
nized that Parliament had entrusted a discretionary duty to a public authority in
charge of running a juvenile detention facility as to how to best achieve the pub-
lic purposes assigned to that authority.0 6 Lord Diplock opined that a court
should not substitute its own view of the appropriate means for the department
through the granting of an action for negligence. 7 "To ask whether the defen-
dant had been negligent in adopting [the policies governing the structure of the
101 Id. at 82-83.
102. Crown Liability Act, supra note 1.
103 Caparo Indus. Plc. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 App. Cas. 605, 618 (appeal taken from Eng.);
PAUL P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 864-67 (4'b ed. 1999).
104 CRAIG, supra note 103, at 123.
105 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, App. Cas. 74, 86 (1941)(appeal taken from
England).
106 Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office, 1970 App. Cas. 1004 (1970).
107 Id. at 1067-68.
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program] would be to ask the court to balance the competing interests [of soci-
ety], a task which, as Lord Diplock stated, the court is not competent to per-
form. "108
The House of Lords first explicitly explored the dichotomy in its decision in
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council."° In Anns, the defendant municipal
council was sued by real property owners who alleged that the council had
breached a claimed duty imposed by a building statute by either not inspecting
the foundations of their edifice during its construction or by inspecting it in a
negligent manner. This purported breach of duty allowed the building to be con-
structed upon an inadequate foundational base, and it was averred by the plain-
tiffs that they suffered damages as a result of the council's negligence.
In his opinion in Anns, Lord Wilberforce noted that the duty of care owed
by a public authority to an individual, "may be limited by considerations of pol-
icy. Where the defendant is the Crown, or any other public authority, an impor-
tant consideration of policy is the concern of courts not to disturb decisions made
by public officials who are ultimately accountable to the electorate."'"i Lord
Wilberforce then directly addressed, for the first time in English law, the distinc-
tion between planning and operational decisions. He substituted the term "pol-
icy" for "planning" in his determination of the issue, and he observed that "many
'operational' powers or duties have in them some element of 'discretion'. It can
safely be said that the more 'operational' a power or duty may be, the easier it is
to superimpose a common law duty of care.""' Thus, a public authority's activi-
ties deriving from policy decisions concerning the allocation and distribution of
scarce resources and assets would not be reviewable by the courts, but a review-
able duty of care might be determined to exist when the cause of action arose out
of the alleged careless or negligent operational implementation of those policies.
This position was summarized in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,"2
where Lord Browne-Wilkinson formulated a three-stage test to accommodate the
application of the policy/operational distinction:
[First] Where Parliament has conferred a statutory discretion on a public au-
thority, it is for that authority, not for the courts, to exercise the discretion: noth-
ing which the authority does within the ambit of the discretion can be actionable
at common law. [Second] If the decision complained of falls outside the statutory
discretion, it can (but not necessarily will) give rise to common law liability.
However, if the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion include matters
of policy, the court cannot adjudicate on such policy matters and therefore cannot
reach the conclusion that the decision was outside the ambit of the statutory dis-
cretion. Therefore a common law duty of care in relation to the taking of deci-
sions involving policy matters cannot exist ....
108 Paul P. Craig, Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power, 94 L. Q. Rev. 428, 437
(1978).
109 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, App. Cas. 728 (1978).
110 HOGG, supra note 22, at 122.
111 Anns, supra note 109, at 754.
112 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council, 2 App. Cas. 633 (1995).
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[Third] If the plaintiff's complaint alleges carelessness, not in the taking of a
discretionary decision to do some act, but in the practical manner in which that
act has been performed . . . the question whether or not there is a common law
duty of care falls to be decided by applying the usual principles ...."
Accordingly, an action against a public authority could only succeed if the
activities made the basis of a plaintiffs claims occurred outside the authority's
discretionary authority, and in making this determination "the court could not as-
sess factors which were felt to be non-justiciable, or within the policy category of
the policy/operational dichotomy.". 4 Thus, in the event that a trial court deter-
mines that a public authority owes a common law duty of care to a plaintiff, that
plaintiff must then prove that the authority's conduct was justiciable because it
was acting outside its statutory discretion.
While England's government authority tort liability scenario became quite
similar to that of the United States with respect to its adoption of the pol-
icy/operational distinction, the basis underlying the application of the dichotomy
in English law is a judicially created discretionary function exception. Further, if
a plaintiff demonstrates that an authority acted outside its discretion, the court
must determine whether a duty of care might actually be owed to the plaintiff.
Alternatively, the United States' statutory discretionary function exception makes
no effort to articulate this legal basis for non-suit, as the duty of care question is
a moot issue due to the fact that the government's sovereign immunity in this
realm has never been waived. Hence the dichotomy in these countries evolved in
separate but comparatively similar manners that reflect the distinctions typical of
the jurisprudence of their particular states.
However, England's public liability case law has recently encountered an
impediment to its natural evolutionary growth. The Human Rights Act, 1998
(HRA), incorporated the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into
English domestic law. Section 6 of the HRA requires that the courts interpret
legislation in accordance with the ECHR. Section 2 of the HRA provides that
the national courts, in making their determinations of law, must consider the de-
cisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), although the ECtHR's
decisions are not binding as precedent. Accordingly, the common law of Eng-
land must now be viewed in light of Article 6 of the ECHR, and acts of public
authorities that are incompatible with those rights are unlawful. 5
In 1998 the ECtHR determined in its decision in Osman v. United Kingdom,
that the decision in the underlying suit was contrary to the provisions of Article 6
of the ECHR.1 6 In the underlying suit, a domestic court determined at the outset
of litigation that the public authority in question owed no duty of care to a plain-
tiff, and thus the plaintiffs case was struck for failing to state a viable claim.
113 Id. at 738-739.
114 Paul P. Craig & Duncan Fairgrieve, Barrett, Negligence and Discretionary Powers, 1999
Pub. L. 627, 631.
115 CRAIG, supra note 103, at 445.
116 Osman v. United Kingdom, 5 B.H.R.C. 293 (1998).
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The House of Lords affirmed the lower court, and the ECtHR essentially deter-
mined that the plaintiff's human rights were violated by the English legal system
when it denied him a hearing on the merits of his claim. The decision of the
ECtHR did not, however, directly address the issue concerning the fact that the
claim was struck because there was no viable cause of action asserted under Eng-
lish substantive law. Regardless, the ECtHR resolved that the plaintiff was enti-
tled to argue his case so that his allegations of tortious conduct might be investi-
gated.
Accordingly, when the House of Lords was confronted with another gov-
ernment liability case where the plaintiff's claim had been struck"' at the outset
of litigation at the county court level based on the lack of existence of a duty of
care in Barrett v. Enfield LBC", Lord Browne-Wilkinson found the Osman
precedent difficult to apply. Theoretically, the House of Lords could have opted
to disregard the Osman precedent and might have ruled according to established
English law," 9 but the plaintiff would have almost certainly taken his case to the
ECtHR in an effort to enforce the Osman reasoning in Barrett. So, in an effort
to comply with the spirit of the ECtHR's decision in Osman, the House of Lords
accepted the appeal. The case was sent back to the county court to make a rea-
soned decision of whether it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty
on the public authority in this instance based upon a reasoned consideration of the
detriment to the public interest, should liability be held to exist as against the to-
tal loss to all potential plaintiffs were there held to be no viable cause of action. 120
The English common law delineating the policy/operational dichotomy is
thus confronted with an unexpected hurdle in its evolutionary development as it
seeks to define and delineate the scope of sovereign immunity as it currently
stands in England today. The imposition of an external due process standard will
certainly have a chilling effect of any trial court confronted with a Motion to
Strike a claim based upon a government-plead claim that the conduct in question
is not actionable based upon its public policy nature. Rather, it would certainly
appear more expedient to deny such a request and let discovery proceed regard-
less of the viability of either party's claim.
At least one English legal scholar has thus suggested that the pol-
icy/operational distinction be abandoned in favor of simply addressing the justi-
ciability of the plaintiff's action.' However, this results in what is basically a
semantic change, as evidenced by the fact that the same salient dilemma still
faces courts in the United States, which has arguably already based its exception
on this position, as the same viability issues would exist regardless of what the
distinction is called. Thus in a typical case, the plaintiff would ask the court to
117 English civil procedure uses a motion to strike in the same manner that the United States
uses a motion to dismiss, and the two are very similar with respect to their procedural application and
effect.
118 Barrett v. Enfield LBC, 3 All E.R. 19 (1999).
119 Craig & Fairgrieve, supra note 114, at 631.
120 Barrett, supra note 118, at 199f-j; Craig & Fairgrieve, supra note 114, at 631.
121 CRAIG, supra note 114, at 862-63.
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consider the merits of his claim (based upon the degree of harm sustained) in
light of the adverse effects the viability of same would have on any public inter-
est benefits (social, economic, and political) that are derived from preserving the
government authority's claim of non-suit in response to the authority's motion to
strike. Accordingly, the evolutionary trend of the policy/operational dichotomy
should and will continue as the English appellate courts seek to surmount this
most recent obstacle in their efforts to secure justice through the application of
the common law.
C. Canada
The petition of right, including the requirement of the fiat, remained the
procedure for suing the Crown in Canada until after the enactment of the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, in the United Kingdom. The Federal Parliament acted in
stages, abolishing the fiat requirement in 1951, and it adopted the Crown Liabil-
ity Act in 1952 (now codified as the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C., ch. C-50
(1985)(Can.)). However, it retained the procedural requisite of the petition of
right until 1971.122 It is important to note that, until 1949, the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council in England was "the major interpreter of the Canadian
constitution and the major expounder of explicit views on the nature of Canadian
federalism" until appeals to this body were abolished by the British North Amer-
ica Act, 1949.123 Thus, it was not until after 1949 that Canadian common law
was necessarily a more accurate reflection of the social, political, and economic
values of Canadian society (or at least the empowered element of same), as it was
not until this time that Canada had the final (and only) say in the interpretation of
its laws.
The Crown Liability Act was modeled after the English Crown Proceedings
Act, 1947,124 and it allowed that the federal government (the Crown) would be
liable:
- in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and
capacity, it would be liable
- in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown; or
- in respect of a breach of duty attaching to the ownership, occupation, posses-
sion or control of property. 
21
122 HOGG, supra note 22, at 7-8.
123 GARTH STEVENSON, UNFULFILLED UNION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM & NATIONAL UNITY
43, 259 (rev. ed. 1982).
124 HOGG, supra note 22, at 84-85.
125 Crown Liability Act, supra note 1, § 3; "A special problem with respect the Crown in right
of Canada, in situations where it is liable in tort, is the choice of applicable law. Tort law is gener-
ally provincial, not federal. The best view seems to be that the federal Crown's liability in tort should
be determined in accordance with the law of the province in which the cause of action arose."
HOGG, supra note 22, at 86 n. 33.
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The Act also allowed that, "The Crown is liable for the damage sustained by
any person by reason of a motor vehicle, owned by the Crown, on a highway,
for which the Crown would be liable if were a private person of full age and ca-
pacity," 12 6 Hence, in its partial waiver of the Crown's common law immunity
form suit, the Crown Liability Act also did not specifically reserve the govern-
ment's immunity with respect to discretionary duties and functions. Rather, the
policy/operational distinction developed out of the court's consideration of the
duty of care issue and was implemented by means of case law in the same man-
ner as it did in England.
The foremost case delineating the liability of public authorities is the Su-
preme Court of Canada's opinion in Nielson v. Kamloops (City). 27 In resolving
the issue of the potential liability of a public authority involved in a fact scenario
that is quite similar to the fact scenario considered by the House of Lords in
Ans, the Kamloops majority opinion held that liability might lie against a mu-
nicipality for failing to enforce a stop work order issued to a builder after the
municipality's inspector discovered faulty foundations during the construction of
a property. The stop work order was issued for the express purpose of protect-
ing the plaintiffs predecessor's interest in the real property. The builder failed to
abide by the order and the municipality did not attempt to enforce it.'28
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Ans
in its consideration of whether the municipality owed a duty of care to the plain-
tiff,'29 and, accordingly, the majority held that the decision of the public authority
as concerning whether or not it should enforce its own order was operational in
nature and gave rise to a duty of care to the plaintiff."0 However, the majority
also noted that the municipality would not have breached any duty of care if its
affirmative decision not to enforce the stop work order was based on legitimate
public policy reasons: "If it decided against taking them, say on economic
grounds, then it would be a legitimate policy decision within the operational con-
text and the courts should not interfere with it. ""' The municipality's duty of
care required, "at the very least, a conscious decision not to act on policy
grounds." 3 2 Because the evidence suggested that the issue of enforcement was
simply not addressed by the municipality, Justice Wilson, writing for the major-
ity, concluded that, "In my view, inaction for no reason or inaction for improper
reason cannot be a policy decision taken in the bona fide exercise of discre-
126 Crown Liability Act, supra note 1, § 4.
127 Nielson v. City of Kaloops et al., [1984] 2 S.C. R. 2.
128 Id. at. 6-7.
129 Id. at 117. The two-step test concerning whether a duty of care might be owed, as set forth
in Anns, supra, was adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in its opinion in Kamloops, and it has
subsequently been readopted by the Supreme Court as the "Anns/Kamloops test" in Just v. British
Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228; Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R.
165; and Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 168 D.L.R. 513.
130 Kaloops, supra note 127, at 24.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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tion. " '33
The Supreme Court of Canada next addressed the policy/operational distinc-
tion in Just v. British Columbia34 . In Just, Justice Cory, writing for the major-
ity, recognized the "dilemma giving rise to the continuing judicial struggle to dif-
ferentiate between 'policy' and 'operation.""1 35  He reviewed English, United
States, and Australian case law addressing the underlying rationale for the dis-
tinction, and he concluded that:
The decisions in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council and City of Kamloops
v. Nielson indicate that a government agency in reaching a decision pertaining to
inspection must act in a reasonable manner which constitutes a bona fide exer-
cise of discretion. To do so they must specifically consider whether to inspect
and if so, the system of inspection must be a reasonable one in all of the circum-
stances .... Thus a true policy decision may be made at a lower level pro-
vided that the government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision in
light of the surrounding circumstances.' 36
Justice Cory then proceeded to set forth examples of policy considerations
that would fall within the "policy" distinction, and he noted that the "manner and
quality" of the public authority's implementation of an otherwise policy-oriented
program "is clearly part of the operational aspect of a government activity and
falls to be assessed in the standard of care issue."' 37
Accordingly, the common law development of the policy/operational dichot-
omy in Canada can be viewed as generally falling in line with the English and
United States case law interpreting the issue. However, Canada is not bound to
follow the decisions of the ECtHR, as is its English counterpart, and thus it is
unlikely that it will impose the same awkward procedural hurdles into its case
law interpreting and delineating the distinction. Thus, while it will continue to
view English substantive law as persuasive in its determinations, the actual pro-
cedural evolution will be far more akin to the United States' interpretive common
law.
D. Australia
The Australian Commonwealth maintains a formal Constitutional link with
the British Crown, however like Canada the decisions of Australia's courts are
no longer appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England.
Nevertheless, Australian courts look to English case law for persuasive precedent
133 Id.
134 Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
135 Id. at 1239.
136 Id. at 1242-43.
137 Id. at 1244-45. Justice Cory also noted that, "[T]he requisite standard of care to be applied
to the particular operation must be assessed in light of all the surrounding circumstances including,
for example, budgetary restraints and the availability of qualified personnel and equipment." Id. at
1245.
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in interpreting their own common law. Also, Australia was the first of the coun-
tries considered in this article to partially waive its immunity, and it did so in §
64 of the Judiciary Act, 1903. In pertinent part, § 64 provides that "in any suit
to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of the parties shall as
nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on
either side, as in a suit between subject and subject.""'
This statutory waiver of immunity predates the English Crown Proceedings
Act, 1947 by almost half of a century, and this partially explains why the Austra-
lian common law interpretation of the waiver is occasionally divergent from the
English, Canadian, and New Zealand law despite the fact that the Australian
courts rely heavily on the decisions of the House of Lords in this area.
The Australian common law starting point in determining whether liability
might exist against a public authority is found in the decision of High Court of
Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman. 3 9 In Heyman, Justice Mason
observed that:
Generally speaking, a public authority which is under no statutory obligation to
exercise a power comes under no common law duty of care to do so .... But
an authority may by its conduct place itself in such a position that it attracts a
duty of care which calls for exercise of the power. A common illustration is
provided by the cases in which an authority in the exercise of its functions has
created a danger, thereby subjecting itself to a duty of care for the safety of oth-
ers which must be discharged by an exercise of its statutory powers or by giving
a warning .... 140
The policy/operational distinction was first introduced into Australian com-
mon law by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in L. v. Common-
wealth.141 In L v. Commonwealth, the plaintiff was a temporary prisoner in an
"obsolete, over-crowded and grossly inadequate" facility who was placed by
prison authorities in a cell with two other prisoners, both of whom had known
violent propensities.4 2 The plaintiff was assaulted and raped by his cellmates,
and he sued the Commonwealth for damages sustained as the result of the negli-
gence of the prison officials in allowing this assault to take place. 1
4 3
In determining that liability could lie against the government, Justice Ward
accepted the distinction between the polLy and operational levels of government
activity.'" While he determined that the physical inadequacy of the prison struc-
ture (in that it was not large enough to segregate prisoners for their own protec-
138 Australian Judiciary Act Section 64 (1903).
139 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424.
140 Id. at 459-60.
141 L. v. Commonwealth (1976) 10 A.L.R. 269 (N.T.S.C.). This case preceded the House of
Lords' decision in Anns by approximately two years, making Australia the first country outside of the
United States to adopt the distinction.
142 Id. at 278-80.
143 Id. at 270-71.
144 Id. at 276.
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tion) was a deficiency at the planning level and therefore not actionable, he also
determined that the prison authority's operational activities in placing the plaintiff
in a cell with prisoners with a known propensity for violence and in failing to
take adequate remedial measures to protect the plaintiff's welfare once the threat
was known amounted to actionable negligence."'
Like all legal systems implementing the distinction, the courts in Australia
have also recognized the difficulties inherent in its application and have made ef-
forts to delineate the distinction. Justice Mason, in his reasons for decision in
Heyman, observed that:
The distinction between policy and operational factors is not easy to formu-
late, but the dividing line between them will be observed if we recognize that a
public authority is under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or
are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints.
Thus budgetary allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms of allo-
cation of resources cannot be made the subject of a duty of care. But it may be
otherwise when the courts are called upon to apply a standard of care to action or
inaction that is merely the product of administrative direction, expert or profes-
sional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness.'"
Australia has followed English common law precedent in interpreting the
distinction, and the High Court looked to, inter alia, the House of Lords' opinion
in X v Bedfordshire County Council in its opinion Crimmins v Stevedoring Indus-
try Finance Committee"4 7 addressing the issue of when the policy/operational dis-
tinction would preclude consequent consideration of whether a duty of care might
exist.
In Crimmins, the High Court considered the issue of whether a public au-
thority might owe a duty of care to an individual,' 48 and it extensively considered
the decisions of the House of Lords discussed previously in this article addressing
the issue of when liability might be allowed to lie in making its own determina-
tion. In Crimmins, the plaintiff sued a public authority in a common law negli-
gence action. The trial court found for the plaintiff, and the Victorian Court of
Appeal set aside the verdict, holding that the statutory authority did not owe a
common law duty of care to the plaintiff. 4 9 In his reasons for decision-reversing
the Court of Appeal, Justice McHugh of the High Court of Australia (with Chief
Justice Gleeson, author of the lead decision, agreeing)5 ° resolved that a duty of
care did, in fact, exist, and he explained his reasoning by opining:
In my opinion, therefore, in a novel case where a plaintiff alleges that a statutory
authority owed him or her a common law duty of care and breached that duty by
failing to exercise a statutory power, the issue of duty should be determined by
145 Id. at 276, 281.
146 Heyman, supra note 139, at 469.
147 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee, (1999) 167 A.L.R. 1, 22.
148 Id. at 1, 3 and 13.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 4.
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the following questions:
1. Was it reasonably foreseeable that an act or omission of the defendant,
including a failure to exercise its statutory powers, would result in injury to
the plaintiff or his or her interests? If no, then there is no duty.
2. By reason of the defendant's statutory or assumed obligations or control,
did the defendant have the power to protect a specific class including the
plaintiff (rather than the public at large) from a risk of harm? If no, then
there is no duty.
3. Was the plaintiff or were the plaintiffs interests vulnerable in the sense
that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to adequately safeguard
himself or herself or those interests from harm? If no, then there is no duty.
4. Did the defendant know, or ought the defendant to have known, of the
risk of harm to the specific class including the plaintiff if it did not exercise
its powers? If no, then there is no duty.
5. Would such a duty impose liability with respect to the defendant's exer-
cise of "core policy-making" or "quasi-legislative" functions? If yes, then
there is no duty.
6. Are there any other supervening reasons in policy to deny the existence
of a duty of care (e.g., the imposition of a duty is inconsistent with the
statutory scheme, or the case is concerned with pure economic loss and the
application of principles in that field deny the existence of a duty)? If yes,
then there is no duty.
If the first four questions are answered in the affirmative, and the last two in
the negative, it would ordinarily be correct in principle to impose a duty of care
on the statutory authority. '
Thus, the High Court utilized the legal precedent set forth in the English
House of Lords' decisions to formulate and justify their own test for when liabil-
ity may lay and when policy issues may bar an action's viability. Accordingly,
while Australia's legal system still looks to and is influenced by English common
law precedent in determining the scope of immunity still enjoyed by government
authorities, its courts have developed their own unique interpretation of when the
dichotomy might preclude liability. And while the dichotomy is applied in tan-
dem with the consideration of whether a duty of care might exist, as opposed to
subsequent to the consideration of the issue as it occurs in England and Canada
(and New Zealand, as will be shown), the initial pleading by a government au-
thority of the preclusion of liability in an action based upon policy considerations
151 Id. at 24-25.
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would still bar an action at its outset. Hence, the dichotomy has developed in
Australia in a manner that is distinct from, but also similar to, its evolution in the
other States considered in this article.
E. New Zealand
New Zealand's Parliament adopted the Statute of Westminster in 1947, and
thus New Zealand's relationship with England is predicated upon its "common
history and culture.""52 Regardless, New Zealand still retains a formal link with
the laws of England, and, unlike Canada and Australia, decisions of New Zea-
land courts are still appealable to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
(which applies New Zealand law in its review). 53 Further, English case law
from the House of Lords is controlling precedent in interpreting New Zealand
cases in New Zealand courts." 4 It is important to note, however, that the legal
decisions of New Zealand's courts are not appealable to the House of Lords, and
this discrepancy is explained when one notes that the reason "that the hierarchy
of precedents . . . has one tier more than the hierarchy of courts" is that "the
uniformity of the common law of the United Kingdom and the parts of the Com-
monwealth that still permit appeal to the Privy Council can be maintained only by
recognition of the ultimate authority of a single court ... 5
The laws of other countries in the Commonwealth (most importantly Austra-
lia's) are viewed as persuasive precedent in New Zealand law,' 6 but New Zea-
land's Crown Proceedings Act, 1950, was modeled after the English Crown Pro-
ceedings Act, 1947, and bears very little resemblance to Australia's statutory
waiver of liability.'57 The Crown Proceedings Act, 1950, is not a general waiver
of immunity, and, like the Federal Tort Claims Act, instead, "the general princi-
pal of immunity is left but very wide exceptions are carved out of it. "'
The policy/operational dichotomy developed in New Zealand as it did in
England and Canada as its courts sought to delineate the scope of the govern-
ment's immunity, and the foremost New Zealand case addressing the distinction
is ironically the Privy Council's opinion in Rowling v. Takaro Properties [1988]
App. Cas. 473 (P.C. 1987)(appeal taken from N.Z.). The New Zealand courts
are bound by precedent to accept the House of Lord's decision in Anns v. Merton
London Borough, as controlling precedent in the interpretation of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy as it has been developed in New Zealand's common
law, but the distinction was further explored in Rowling. In Rowling, Lord Keith
addressed the policy/operational dichotomy in the contemporary English common
152 JAMES HUFFMAN, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY AND DISASTER MITIGATION 260 (1986).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 260.
155 Id.; K.J. SCOTT, THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTION 157 (1962).
156 HUFFMAN, supra note 152, at 260.
157 Id. at 303.
158 Id. (quoting from the Public ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, DAMAGES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 (1980)).
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law tradition by enquiring as to whether (and when) a duty of care on the part of
a government minister to a private party may arise.' 59 The plaintiff's Complaint
was initially struck for failing to state a claim based upon the trial court's deter-
mination that no duty of care existed based on the minister's purported ultra vires
exercise of his statutory powers.60 After many levels of appeals and reverses in
the New Zealand legal system, the trial court determined that a duty of care to
the plaintiff existed and it eventually entered a judgment on the merits for the
plaintiff. 161
In the opinion deriving from the eventual appeal by the government minister
to the Privy Council on, inter alia, the discretionary authority issue, Lord Keith
quoted extensively from that part of the opinion of the New Zealand appellate
court recounting the problems they encountered in applying the dichotomy, and
noted that "Their Lordships feel considerable sympathy with . . .[the New Zea-
land court's] difficulty in solving the problem by simple reference to this distinc-
tion." 162
Lord Keith noted that the policy/operational distinction does not provide a
touchstone of liability, but rather is expressive of the need to exclude altogether
those cases in which the decision under attack is of such a kind that a question
whether it has been made negligently is unsuitable for judicial resolution, of
which notable examples are discretionary decisions on the allocation of scarce
resources or the distribution of risks. If this is right, classification of the relevant
decision as a policy or planning decision in this sense may exclude liability; but a
conclusion that it does not fall within this category does not, in their Lordships'
opinion, mean that a duty of care will necessarily exist. 1
63
Correspondingly, the Privy Council determined that even if the minister
misinterpreted his statutory power and acted outside the scope of his discretion as
the result of his error, the activities performed that were predicated upon his mis-
taken beliefs would not be characterized as negligent if the erroneous interpreta-
tion was clearly "a tenable one."1
The common law development of the policy/operational dichotomy in New
Zealand is generally governed by English case law interpretation of the issue, and
the distinction's development in New Zealand will most likely mirror its devel-
opment in England. Like Canada, however, New Zealand is not bound to con-
sider the decisions of the ECtHR, and thus it is unlikely that it will impose the
same procedural obstacles into its case law interpreting and delineating the dis-
tinction.
159 Rowling v. Takaro Properties [19881 1 A.C. 473, 500 (U.K.).
160 Id. at 497.
161 Id. at 498-99.
162 Id. at 501.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 507.
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IV. A UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM WOULD ALLEVIATE
THE DILEMMAS ENCOUNTERED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
POLICY/OPERATIONAL DISTINCTION
The common law judicial systems in each of the States under analysis are
still remarkably similar in procedural structures regardless of the form of gov-
ernment employed by these States. Further, their respective judiciaries continue
to refer to each other's common law developments as persuasive precedent in re-
solving their own related legal issues. The policy/operational dichotomy that
originated in the United States and emigrated back to England is also utilized in
roughly the same manner in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. And despite
the attention received by the dichotomy in the courts of each of the forgoing, the
most enigmatic question, i.e., the demarcation of where policy or discretionary
considerations (and immunity) end and where operational activities (and tort li-
ability) begin, continues to vex the courts attempting to apply the distinction.
Further, England's submission to the jurisdictional authority of the ECtHR has
presented a new obstacle in the evolutionary development of the dichotomy, and,
as noted supr, some legal authorities are suggesting that it is now time to aban-
don the distinction as untenable. This, however, is not necessarily the case.
Rather, this development is a natural and logical subsequent evolutionary step in
the development of this complex legal distinction.
It is proposed in this article that the policy/operational dichotomy should
continue to remain a test of the viability of an action in negligence against a
State. However, it should be implemented in a bifurcated two-step form. The
first step of the test would be to determine whether, as a matter of law at the time
of the filing of a Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike based upon the govern-
mental authority's defense that immunity has not been waived in this area, the
plaintiffs' Complaint alleges on its face that the State is liable to the plaintiffs for
breaching a duty of care as predicated upon policy issues that are clearly not vi-
able (such as the discretionary allocation of scarce resources or the allocation of
risks). In the event that a claim was determined to be non-viable for such rea-
sons, the action would be precluded as a matter of law and dismissed at that time.
However, in the event that it is not readily apparent that the Complaint is
not actionable for policy reasons at the outset of litigation, the next step, or sec-
ond stage, would require that the court weigh the discretionary reasonableness of
the conduct exercised by the governmental body in light of both the injury sus-
tained by the claimant and the public policy issues influencing the government
body's conduct. This question would be of a quasi-legal/quasi-factual nature, as
it would require the court to consider the injuries sustained by the claimant in
light of public policy. It should be considered at the end of a shortened discov-
ery process that would be specifically tailored to resolve the viability issue. In
the event that the court determined that, as a matter of law, the government au-
thority proffered sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate that it had acted
reasonably in light of the applicable government policies and that it had not
caused the claimant to sustain injuries that were unreasonable in light of the goals
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sought to be achieved by the government body, then the suit would be barred as
non-viable." 6 If any questions of fact preclude the court's denial of the viability
of the claim as a matter of law after the second stage of the test is applied, the
claim should be allowed to go to trial for a determination of the issue on the mer-
its of the case.
This evolutionary development of the policy/operational dichotomy would
be consistent with the state of the law in the United States, England, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, and it would allow the English legal system to rec-
oncile its common law with the requirements set for the ECtHR in its opinion in
Osman. Further, the bifurcated nature of the test is consistent with and would
greater satisfy the goals of legal reform and fairness by allowing courts, in the
application of the second stage of the test, to take into consideration the injuries
averred by plaintiffs and would afford plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge the
reasonableness of the governmental authority's immunity claim in light of the
real burden borne by individuals within society. The second stage of the test
would also aid the courts in resolving difficult cases, as it is not merely an appli-
cation of the orthodox distinction but rather it is an interpretary, evolutionary
outgrowth of the doctrine that is designed to further promote its fair implementa-
tion. It expands upon the theory of the dichotomy by allowing the courts to con-
sider evidence on the issue of viability while still allowing government authorities
to reasonably contain and limit legal actions by providing for the efficient dis-
posal of claims that are legitimately barred by public policy considerations. Ac-
cordingly, it would allow the courts to apply the policy/operational dichotomy in
a manner that is consistent with the original intentions of its creators but yet still
is mindful of the dynamic social, political, and economic factors that are continu-
ously redefining societal goals and values.
Authority for the viability of this proposal can be found in the United States
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107
S. Ct. 3034 (1987). Anderson dealt with the reasonableness of a trial court's
grant of a "motion to dismiss or for summary judgment" based on qualified im-
munity grounds that was filed in response to the plaintiffs' (the Creightons')
complaint and before any discovery occurred." 6  The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and held that factual disputes concerning the vi-
165 While it is true that a party who sues the United States has the burden of pointing to a Con-
gressional act that provides the government's consent to the suit (See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S.
643, 648 (1962)), the burden of proving the non-viability of an action plead under the Federal Tort
Claims Act should be borne by the defendant governmental authority. This is because the govern-
mental authority, as the movant and the profferer of an affirmative defense, should bear the onus of
demonstrating the viability of its own motion. This is also because the government authority, in pre-
cluding the viability of the plaintiffs' claims with its sovereign immunity defense, will be infringing
upon the plaintiffs' human and fundamental right to due process. Thus, the government authority
should be saddled with the burden of proving that its activities were reasonably related to the imple-
mentation of the public policy submitted as the basis for immunity and that it had not caused the
claimant, in the application of this policy, to sustain injuries that were unreasonable in light of the
goals sought to be achieved in the implementation of the policies.
166 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987).
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ability of the governmental agent's (Anderson's) claim of qualified immunity re-
mained unresolved.'67 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, noted that quali-
fied immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a liti-
gation.16' Nevertheless, the case was remanded back to the trial court so that
limited discovery on the immunity issue could take place. 169 In his opinion, Jus-
tice Scalia observed that "one of the purposes... of qualified immunity is to pro-
tect officials from the 'broad ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive
of effective government,"' and thus he directed that:
[O]n remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons al-
lege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discov-
ery. If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims are different from those
the Creighton's allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson's motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course,
any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson's
qualified immunity. 70
While this note is not directly dispositive of procedural handling of the di-
chotomy, Justice Scalia's directions on remand in Anderson provide an instruc-
tive guide as to how to begin to resolve the policy/operational distinction in the
future. Further, the fact that the Anderson Court has already directly supported
this procedural mechanism suggests that United States courts would welcome this
proposal. Finally, because of the jurisprudential borrowing that has character-
ized the respective evolutions of the policy/operational dichotomy in all of the
countries addressed in this article, it is foreseeable that all of the legal systems
considered could adopt this bifurcated test in an effort to manage the opacity that
continues to make the dichotomy a difficult distinction to apply.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States, England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have
sought to remedy the inherent inequities encountered in the sovereign immunity
provisions remaining in their respective common laws by legislating a partial
waiver of their immunity from suits filed by private individuals. At this time,
public policy considerations still require that the immunity from suit enjoyed by
public authorities not be fully and entirely waived. In an effort to impose order
upon a chaotic situation, the policy/operational dichotomy has emerged in all of
the forgoing countries as their courts have attempted to delineate the scope of
their respective society's waiver of immunity. However, this dichotomy is not,
167 Id.
168 Id. at 646, n. 6.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 646, n. 6.
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at present, the panacea that the legal systems might have hoped it would be.
Rather, it must continue to be developed and refined, as are all other doctrines in
the common law, in order that the dichotomy might be more useful to the courts
in the elusive task of attempting to mete out the justice demanded by the parties
submitting to the jurisdiction of their legal systems.
However, the policy/operational dichotomy is more than a remedial distinc-
tion: its evolutionary development is an example of the ever-continuing transfor-
mation of the common law. The dichotomy is always seeking, but never quite
achieving, a state of perfection through which justice can reliably be achieved.
Accordingly, although the courts continue to revise the common law in order to
reflect society's ever-changing (and rarely concurring) social, political, and eco-
nomic values, the difficulty inherent in applying the dichotomy is not unlike the
difficulty inherent in achieving justice through the application of the common law
to a dynamic society. The proposed bifurcated application of the pol-
icy/operational dichotomy would aid in this effort, and, because it is a simple
procedural mechanism that would be universally applicable in the common law
legal systems found in all of the forgoing States germinating from England's
common law legacy, its facilitation of the substantive development of the com-
mon law would benefit the forgoing legal systems in achieving their commonly
held goal of securing justice for their respective societies.
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A Conversation About Equality*
THE HONOURABLE CLAIRE L'HEUREUX-DUBt,
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Equality is a topic very near to my heart. Since I believe that you have to
pose the right questions to get good answers, I will explore some of the who's,
what's, when's, where's, and why's of equality, although not necessarily in that
order. I sincerely hope that these questions will provide a basis for us to ask
other questions, both of ourselves and of others. For posing questions, talking to
each other, and thinking about what the concept of equality means and should
mean will help all of us come to a better understanding of equality, how it ap-
plies, and what it means, both in our lives and in the law.
II. WHY IS EQUALITY SO IMPORTANT?
Why are we not prepared to accept that we can be treated with less dignity
because of the groups to which we belong or with which we identify? In my
opinion, our desire for equality stems from our desire for justice and, put simply,
inequality is injustice. It is unjust to treat people as less worthy or less deserving
because of inherent personal characteristics, circumstances in which they find
themselves, or fundamental choices they have made. It is unjust for those who
have historically held advantages and privileges in society to continue those privi-
leges at the expense of others. When there is inequality, oppression is allowed,
facilitated, and encouraged. In Canada, where we believe every member of soci-
ety is a full member, it is contrary to our conception of justice to suggest that
people can be treated as less worthy, less deserving, or less equal because of
their personal characteristics or identity.
I ask you: if you were given the opportunity to design a model society, not
knowing a priori who you would be or into what role you would be born, know-
ing only that the odds were roughly even that you would be born into a position
This paper was initially published in a longer form as C. L' Heureux-Dube,
Conversations on Equality (1999) 26 Man. L.J. 273.
** I wish to thank my law clerks for their invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this paper.
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of relative empowerment or relative disempowerment, what would your society
look like? I put it to you that almost anyone in such a position would design a
society that treated each and every individual with dignity, and offered them
equal opportunity to realize their goals and expectations. Of course, I am not
talking only about you, but about your children, and your children's children.
The call to arms of equality seekers today is really an investment in tomorrow.
III. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR INEQUALITY?
John Stuart Mill, one of the first philosophers to recognize the interrelation-
ship between individual human dignity and the good of the community, observed
that the law assumes that existing relationships of domination and subordination
are "natural".' He argued that the law plays an insidious role when it adopts the
status quo and converts a relationship of inequality from a purely physical fact to
a legal right.2 Once inequality is clothed in the legitimising language of rights and
law, it receives the sanction of society.3 Mill asked whether there is ever domi-
nation that appears unnatural to those who wield it.
4
This observation is as true today as it was when he made it. Inequality per-
meates the social, legal, and political institutions that are central to the workings
of our society. A renewed commitment to its eradication requires that we look
deep into ourselves and into the reality experienced by those who have not his-
torically dominated "by nature".
While it is interesting to note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms was proclaimed in force in 1982, thereby constitutionalizing certain human,
civil and political rights in Canada, implementation of section 15, which guaran-
tees "equality without discrimination" to all individuals, was delayed until 1985.'
Equality without discrimination was not a very new or revolutionary concept in
1982 and yet implementation of section 15 was delayed for three years beyond
any of the other newly constitutionalized fundamental human rights. In my view,
this delay allowed for the profound re-examination of Canada's basic laws and
institutions that the recognition of such a right required. I find it a somewhat dis-
turbing indictment of our past that, in 1982, we felt that our laws might be so
discriminatory that we would need several years of grace before permitting indi-
viduals to challenge them.
'Daniel Proulx, L'objet des droits constitutionnels 6 l'galitg 29 C. de D. 567,570
(1988).
2id.
3 Lorenne Clark, Liberalism and the Living Tree: Women, Equality and the Char-
ter 28(2) Alta. L. Rev. 384, 390 (1988), citing J.S. Mill, "The Subjugation of
Women" in Essays on Sex Equality 129-130 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970).
4Id. at 391.
5 Const. Act 1982, pt. I, § 15 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedeoms), Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). [hereinafter the Charter]
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A few brief comments on some of Canada's historical equality "bench-
marks" demonstrates why our drafters' concerns may have been justified. For
instance, it was not until 1929 that the British Privy Council, acting as Canada's
final court of appeal, finally recognized that women were "persons", and thereby
able to be appointed to the Senate.6 Since that time, slowly but surely, other ob-
stacles to equality have fallen under the relentless pressure of social change.
However, many of these moves occurred much later than many people realize.
Among the most blatant examples, women could not vote in Qudbec elections un-
til 1940.' Federally, Japanese Canadians could not vote until 1948, and status
Indians gained the franchise only in 1960.8 Thus, even glaring formal inequali-
ties such as these permeated the very foundations of our democracy well into this
century.
Parliament did enact an equality guarantee in the Canadian Bill of Rights in
1960.' While this was a positive step, no great immediate strides toward substan-
tive equality came about as a result. The Bill of Rights was simply a statute like
any other. It was interpreted narrowly because it lacked the authority of a consti-
tutional document and it did not apply to provincial laws. In one infamous Bill of
Rights case, Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, the Supreme Court held that
denying benefits on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination, since the
distinction was based on the fact that the women were pregnant, rather than the
fact that they were women.' ° In another case, Attorney General v. Lavell, a law
which disqualified native women who married non-natives from receiving certain
benefits related to Indian status, but did not similarly disqualify native men, was
held not to be discriminatory, since all native women were treated equally with
respect to each other." These cases demonstrated that the Bill of Rights, as the
Supreme Court interpreted it, only guaranteed equality to the extent that people
were the same. Women, minorities, and the disabled were fully "equal" within
their individual groups, but only to the extent that they were no different from
the grouping of white, able-bodied men. For those who were disadvantaged be-
cause they were different from what society considered the 'norm', this road to
equality was a dead end.
6 Edwards v. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124.
7 Susan Jackel, Women's Suffrage in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA:
YEAR 2000 EDITION 2535 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999).
8 John C. Courtney, Franchise in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA: YEAR
2000 EDITION 907 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999).
9 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985 (App. III).
[hereinafter the Bill of Rights]
10 Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
"1 Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
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IV. WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN CANADA TO SPEAK OF "EQUALITY" IN
THIS DAY AND AGE?
Unlike the American Bill of Rights, the Charter does not simply assert a
right of "equal protection"; it speaks of "equality without discrimination". 2 My
first observation about these two documents is that they grew out of two very dif-
ferent historical contexts. In order to understand the equality principle as it ap-
plies in Canada, it is necessary to consider the context in which it developed. If
American constitutional ideals were born of war and revolution, Canada's grew
through evolution. Bit by bit Canada negotiated its way towards independence,
from Confederation in 1867, to the recognition of autonomy from Great Britain
in 1931, to the patriation of the Constitution and the adoption of the Charter in
1982.13
The Charter was enacted nearly 200 years after the American Bill of
Rights. 4 Thus, it reflects the developments in human rights law of the latter half
of the 2 0' century, as well as a Canadian vision of liberty and the state, rather
than the American civil libertarian vision of the 18"' and 19th centuries. Perhaps
for this reason, the Charter places less emphasis on individual rights and more on
collective interests. This is seen in various provisions of the Charter, which tend
to surprise many Americans. For instance, rights under the Charter are subject
to an express limitation under section 1, which says that they are guaranteed,
"subject... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. "' s Secondly, in Canada, diversity is
not a debate-it is a constitutionally recognized value. Our constitution recog-
nizes aboriginal treaty rights and minority language education rights, while sec-
tion 27 of the Charter instructs courts to interpret Charter rights in a manner
consistent with promoting and enhancing Canada's multicultural heritage. 6
Third, property rights are noticeably absent from the Charter, primarily due to
the fear that the inclusion of property rights in a bill of rights would hamper the
power of governments to administer or enact social legislation.
Turning to the Charter's provisions on equality, section 28 states that the
"rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons." 7 Finally, section 15(1), guarantees "equality. . . without
discrimination, and in particular without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability". 8 Af-
12 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1).
's Const. Act 1982, pt. I, § 15 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. II (U.K.).
"4 Id., U.S. CONST., amend. I-X.
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1.
" Id. at §§ 23, 25, 27.
17 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 28.
Id. at § 15(1).
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firmative action is specifically permitted under section 15(2).'9
As the Canadian courts have interpreted these provisions, equality continues
to be a comparative concept. It does not always require that we treat people in
the same way. In fact, sometimes it requires that we treat them differently. In
my view, the recognition that equality and discrimination are inextricably linked
is an important one. It is indicative of a sophisticated understanding of the values
that underlie equality. For equality isn't just about being treated the same, and it
isn't a mathematical equation waiting to be solved. Rather, it is about equal hu-
man dignity, and full membership in society. It is about promoting an equal
sense of self-worth. It is about treating people with equal concern, equal respect,
and equal consideration. These are the values that underlie equality. These are
the values that are offended when we discriminate, consciously or not.
In Canada, our present approach to equality, based on the recognition that
true equality requires substantive change and accommodation rather than simply
formalistic egalitarian treatment, was precipitated by the obviously unfair and in-
equitable results of equality claims determined under the Bill of Rights. When
we moved from the Bill of Rights to the Charter, we made three very important
changes. First, we elevated equality rights to a constitutional level. Second, we
broadened the measure of equality rights. Third, we broadened the reach of
equality rights. All three of these changes constituted essential elements of a
trend intended to promote and achieve substantive democracy in Canada, rather
than just procedural democracy. With the Charter, we have gone from requiring
that laws be applied in the same way to everyone, to the stage of requiring that
the laws, themselves, treat individuals as substantive equals. This, finally, is the
language of substantive equality.
2 0
Several Supreme Court cases illustrate particularly well the ways in which a
determination of when substantive equality rights have been violated requires an
examination of a group§s treatment in the context of Canadian society, and of
whether an individual§s fundamental dignity is violated. They show why differ-
ential treatment may in some cases lead to substantive equality, just as in other
cases, similar treatment may lead to substantive inequality.
Weatherall v. Canada is an example of a case where being treated differ-
ently did not lead to substantive inequality. 2 In that case, the male appellant had
challenged the fact that male prisoners in penitentiaries were searched and pa-
trolled by female guards, but that female prisoners were supervised only by
'
9 Id. at § 15(2).
2 0 See Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 548. For the first use of "substantive
equality" in a Supreme Court decision, see Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695,
786 (per L'Heureux-Dubd J. dissenting). All Supreme Court of Canada judgments
since 1985 are available through the Court's website, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/indexe.htm
21 Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
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members of their own gender.22 The unanimous judgment of our Court held that
the male prisoners had not been discriminated against relative to female prison-
ers. 23 The Court noted the historical, biological, and sociological differences be-
tween men and women, the history of women's disadvantage in society, and the
realities of male violence against women. 24 Because of these factors, cross-
gender searches do not have the same effects on men as they would have on
women.25 The Court's judgment, which upheld the different treatment of male
and female prisoners, demonstrates that equality may sometimes allow or require
differential treatment.
On the reverse side of the same coin, B. C. v. BCGSEU provides an excel-
lent example of a case where being treated the same led to substantive inequal-
ity.26 Tawney Meiorin was a firefighter who had performed her work satisfacto-
rily for over three years .27 Her union argued that she was improperly dismissed
on the basis of her failure to meet a discriminatory aerobic standard required un-
der a new series of fitness tests adopted by the British Columbia provincial Gov-
ernment.28
The Court held that under the B.C. Human Rights Code, the minimum fit-
ness standard discriminated against women and could not be justified as a bona
fide occupational requirement.29 In other words, a lower standard could still pro-
vide sufficient protection to the public, while also having a less discriminatory
impact on women. As in many other cases of human rights code violations,
courts are recognizing that standards set in relation to a traditionally dominant
group, such as male firefighters, must be reviewed from an equality perspective
in order to determine whether they are reasonably necessary to the fulfillment of
a legitimate work-related purpose.
Eldridge v. British Columbia is another case where similar treatment was
held to create substantive inequality.3 In that case, the appellants, who were
deaf, challenged the failure of the British Columbia government to provide sign
language interpreters as part of its publicly funded health care system.3" The
Court held that this constituted discrimination, since those who were not hearing
impaired did not require interpretation services and they were provided with all
22 Id.
23 id.
24 id.
25 id.
26 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Committee) v. BCGSEU,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.
27 id.
28 Id.
29 Id., Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C., ch. 210 (1996)(Can.).
30 Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
31 Id.
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the services necessary to receive effective medical care.32 In contrast, hearing
impaired people, who required interpreters in order to receive effective treat-
ment, were required to pay for this service, and therefore, unlike others, did not
receive the necessary services to enjoy free medical care. 33 Even though, for-
mally, this constituted identical treatment, substantively, the hearing impaired did
not receive equal services from the health care system.
34
Another example is the case of Vriend v. Alberta, which dealt with the fail-
ure of the Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act to provide gays and lesbians
with protection against discrimination. 35 Technically, gays and lesbians and het-
erosexual people were treated the same: none could bring claims under the Al-
berta human rights legislation based on sexual orientation. 36 However, the fact
that only gays and lesbians, not heterosexuals, generally experience discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation meant that the failure to include them in the leg-
islation, even though it formally treated all citizens equally, constituted discrimi-
nation. 37
The Court's decision in Vriend shows the importance of looking beyond the
Charter for the protection of equality rights, since it applies only to government
action. 31 In looking for "WHERE" inequality occurs, we must also turn our
attention to the actions of people outside government, to ensure that in relations
with others, individuals, companies, and groups conduct themselves in accor-
dance with the principles of equality. Decisions of the Supreme Court and of
human rights commissions have reminded us that, for example, when sexual har-
assment occurs, when there is systemic discrimination within a workplace, or
when rules of the workplace have a negative impact on members of certain
groups, discrimination has occurred.
39
Provincial and federal statutory human rights codes remind us that all of our
actions must be consistent with the principles of non-discrimination, and that we
must constantly be vigilant to ensure that we respect others' equality rights. Be-
cause of their importance, our Supreme Court has recognized that human rights
codes have taken on a quasi-constitutional status, and for this reason I have advo-
cated a large and liberal evolving interpretation of the protections contained in
them. In Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop, for example, I argued for an ex-
pansive interpretation of the prohibition in the Canadian Human Rights Act
32 id.
33 id.
34 Id.
35 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
36 id.
37 id.
38 See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
39 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252; Action Travail des Femmes v.
Canadian National Railway, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; O§Malley v. Simpsons-Sears,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 550.
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against discrimination based on "family status." 40 Mr. Mossop did not receive
bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his male partner's father, although he
would have received this leave if his partner had been female.4 ' I wrote that re-
specting the promise of equality contained in the Act required an evolving and
expansive definition of family, one that recognized the reality of the diverse types
of families that exist in our society. The application of the principles of equality
required going beyond traditional definitions of family, to explore what "family"
means to different people in our society.
We must constantly be alert to the fact that the scope of the protection set
out in these equality provisions may still not be a reality for all.42 We need to
recognize that the need to identify inequality is not present only when allegations
of discrimination have been brought under section 15 of the Charter, or under
human rights codes. Rather, in examining other areas of law, we must be alert
to the ways in which the laws' assumptions may not respect the principles of
equality. This approach offers us new understandings in family law, in criminal
law, and into how the law affects the poor and the elderly. It is changing the
way we look at sexual assault, disability, freedom of expression and pornogra-
phy. The task of rooting out inequality and injustice from our society is now ad-
vancing to a higher stage, since, increasingly, we are recognizing that inequality
and discrimination stem not from positive intentions on the part of any given in-
dividual, but rather from the effects of often innocently-motivated actions. This
analysis requires that we understand equality, and make it part of our thinking,
rather than treading heavily on it with the well-worn shoes of unquestioned, and
often stereotypical, assumptions.
I will mention just two examples where the analysis in other areas of law has
required attention to the concept of equality. In Moge v. Moge, consideration of
the principles of equality, and of the historic disadvantages women faced from
marriage breakdown, informed the determination of the appropriate interpretation
of the Divorce Acts provisions on spousal support. 43 Focusing on equality en-
abled the Court to look at the perspective and experiences of women, and to en-
sure that its understanding of spousal support took into account women's needs
and realities. In R. v. Lavallge, Madame Justice Wilson, writing for the majority
of our Court, considered the circumstances of women in relationships with abu-
sive spouses and redefined the criminal law of self-defence in light of the realities
4 0 Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; Canadian
Human Rights Act, S.C. ch.33 (1976-1977) reprinted in R.S.C. ch.H6
(1985)(Can.).
41 MOSSOp, [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 554.
42 For a recent decision illustrating this point, see, e.g., M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3
(holding that the opposite-sex definition of "spouse" used for spousal support de-
termination in the province of Ontario's Family Law Act violated sec. 15 of the
Charter).
43 Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813.
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of their experiences." These cases, and others like them, show that thinking
about equality is more than just analysing discrimination claims or interpreting
human rights codes. Rather, its pursuit requires an understanding of the histori-
cal disadvantages experienced by members of some groups, an awareness of
groups' differences and unique experiences, and a sensitivity to the fact that parts
of the law have been designed by and for those with power and privilege. It re-
quires that in the analysis we undertake in every area of law, we consider various
perspectives, think about the experiences and realities of disadvantaged groups,
and examine the assumptions on which our laws and jurisprudence are based.
V. WHO SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT INEQUALITY?
Many individuals are privileged in numerous ways. Many have never di-
rectly experienced discrimination. Nonetheless, inequality is a problem that af-
fects us all. It is short sighted to assume that it is in our interests to preserve the
systems and institutions that perpetuate our advantage and the relative disadvan-
tage of others. We now understand that people are interdependent, and the
health and dignity of our society depends on the way we treat all of its members.
When some lack the opportunities others have, or are treated without dignity, so-
ciety suffers. When individuals or governments refuse to recognize or respect
the differences of others, the cost is the fostering of intolerance in our society.
Discrimination imposes costs on us all, not just on those who are its direct vic-
tims.
Crime, poverty, unemployment, the fear of walking in the streets of one's
own neighbourhood at night, our heavily burdened social programs: few will
now dispute that all of these problems have at least some of their roots in
inequality. While working to stamp out inequality will not make these problems
go away, it is clear that ignoring inequality may very well aggravate them.
Given that inequality, discrimination and perceived injustice are highly
destabilizing forces in society, anyone who seeks a stable society gains by
weakening those forces. We all have something to learn in this regard,
particularly those who think of equality only in terms of the costs required to
achieve it. As my colleague on the Ontario Court of Appeal, Madame Justice
Rosalie Silberman Abella has observed, "We have no business figuring out the
cost of justice until we can figure out the cost of injustice".
For these reasons, we cannot be concerned only about inequality and dis-
crimination that affect us directly, but we must be vigilant to inequality affecting
others. Working toward a society free from inequality demands that we try to
see the world as experienced by others. We must not only recognize the ways in
which others are similar to us, but also acknowledge and celebrate others' differ-
ences. If we are privileged in certain ways, we must also affirm that others may
44 R. v. Lavallde, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
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be entitled to differential treatment in order to remedy past or present disadvan-
tages imposed by society.
We must remember that inequality and discrimination are as much attitudes
as actions. All of us now have a responsibility to continue to work to bring about
changes that will enable the philosophy of non-discrimination to become a reality
of substantive equality. The quest for equality does not stop when, for instance,
a woman gets a job. It demands pay equity, and a workplace that is sensitive to
the social and family demands that women often face. Equally important, it de-
mands that we recognize that not all men measure success purely by virtue of ca-
reer and financial advancement. New opportunities in the workplace will not
bring meaningful change until it becomes socially acceptable to use them. And
in striving to achieve such ends we must never be deterred by novel solutions.
VI. How Do WE ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF EQUALITY?
Equality is a term that, standing alone, means nothing. It has no universally
recognized, inherent or intrinsic content. But rather than simply trying to define
the term, I think that it is helpful to conceive of equality as a language like every
other: with rules of grammar and syntax, nuances, exceptions, and dialects. Af-
ter all, a language is more than a form of communication. It is an embodiment
of the norms, attitudes, and cultures that are expressed through that language.
Learning a language and learning a culture go hand in hand. I believe that all of
us are already familiar with the basic vocabulary of equality. On the other hand,
I hesitate to say that we are fluent in this language when, in fact, we may only
have a working knowledge of it so far. This language is new to us, because
equality analysis does not fit easily into traditional legal discourses and concepts.
It is not easy to undertake an analysis of the multiple and overlapping manifesta-
tions of inequality in our society using traditional legal tests and tools.
But like many immigrants who once came, and continue to come to North
America, we have now firmly assumed the obligation of learning a new lan-
guage, which will help carry us into tomorrow. More importantly, and after
much delay, we have finally committed ourselves to learning to speak in terms of
meaningful equality.
In our quest to learn the language of equality, we are going through many of
the same difficulties encountered by someone trying to learn a new language.
We interpret simple sentences very well. However, we lack the experience to
deal with more difficult situations. We may improvise by applying approaches
found in traditional legal discourse, but experience shows that resorting to those
rules is only appropriate when the structures underlying the two languages are
substantially the same. Our new task is to revisit our underlying assumptions
about people and social structure, to look beyond the four corners of our respec-
tive legal and social institutions, and to contemplate change when our examina-
tion reveals that the languages are inconsistent. We must try to think in terms of
this new language. As any of you who has tried to learn a second language
knows, learning to think in that language is probably the most important step to
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understanding the language, and this understanding is what is needed in turn to
speak it fluently.
We are all students of this language called equality. I should note that this
language class is particularly difficult because it is a course in which the students
must teach themselves. Fortunately, we are not without direction. Our Rosetta
Stone, our key to understanding, lies in our respective past social experiences, in
the present realities endured by those less fortunate, and in the future aspirations
of one and all. And yet the job does not end here. Implicit in our task of break-
ing down barriers, learning a new language, and questioning assumptions under-
lying some of our oldest and most venerable institutions, is our undertaking to
rebuild what we take apart.
You will recall that I began my remarks to you by posing the question,
"Why equality?". I now conclude by observing that the real question to my mind
is no longer "WHY equality?" but rather "WHEN equality?" In my view, more-
over, the appropriate answer is "Now!" To permit or perpetuate inequality is to
permit or perpetuate injustice. Our public policies, our workplaces, our institu-
tions, and our homes may serve us well, but how do they serve others? Do they
enable all people to enjoy full membership in society, and an equal sense of self-
worth? Do they accord each human being equal concern, respect and considera-
tion? These are difficult questions, but I put it to you that we owe a duty to our-
selves, to others and to the generations to come, to answer these questions, and
then to act on the answers until we've lived up to the equality standard.
The urgency of the task of promoting equality means that the guarantees of
equality in constitutional and international human rights documents here and
around the world are perhaps the most important constitutional or legal instru-
ments we have. These guarantees will, I hope, be at the centre of much of the
work of the courts in coming years, not only when appeals based on equality
provisions themselves are heard, but also as norms which inform and influence
our analysis throughout all areas of law and of life.
Yet as all students know, our understanding of concepts such as equality
continues to evolve, and it requires a constant questioning of our work and our
assumptions to ensure that our task is being accomplished well. By conversing
about equality, by explaining to each other our experiences and understandings,
and by listening to others, we can better comprehend the nuances of this evolving
concept. Questions about fairness and justice in law and society will never dis-
appear. It is my hope, however, that future generations will converse about these
questions fluently, in the language of equality, just as we speak in our native lan-
guage, or mother tongue: without effort, and in an intuitive and natural way. For
when the language of equality becomes our common language, we will truly be
able to say that we live in a just society.
2000

